Majority opinion by Judge Graffeo
Even if a prisoner has a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, corrections officials may get a court order allowing feeding through a tube through the nose when a hunger strike creates a substantial risk of imminent death or serious permanent injury and the feeding is reasonably related to legitimate prison interests, including preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining order and security.
Also joined by Pigott, Read, and Smith.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. A constitutional objection to a force-feeding order is sufficiently preserved when, in light of the circumstances and issues raised at the hearing, the inmate's objection made clear that he viewed insertion of a nasogastric feeding tube as an unconstitutional invasion of bodily integrity and the hearing court understood the objection as one based on the right to avoid unwanted medical intervention, even though the inmate did not cite the Due Process Clause or state the argument with full specificity. 2. The exception to the mootness doctrine applies to a moot challenge to a force-feeding order in an inmate hunger-strike case when the issue is novel, likely to recur, and, given the exigencies involved in addressing a hunger strike, would typically evade review. 3. Even assuming an inmate has a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision may obtain a judicial order permitting nasogastric feeding of a hunger-striking inmate whose refusal to eat has created a substantial risk of imminent death or serious permanent injury when the intervention is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, including preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining institutional order and security.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "In light of the circumstances and issues raised in the hearing court, we conclude that the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment argument was presented sufficiently to satisfy the preservation rule."
- "But it was clear from his posture—indeed, it is evident from the quote above—that he viewed the insertion of a nasogastric feeding tube as an unconstitutional invasion of his bodily integrity; such an argument seems almost inherent in an inmate's opposition to a force-feeding order."
- "Despite the inmate's reference to the Eighth Amendment, the hearing court undoubtedly understood, given DOCCS' reliance on Von Holden, that this aspect of the inmate's constitutional objection was predicated on the right to avoid unwanted medical intervention."
- "To be sure, in the hearing court the inmate did not reference the Due Process Clause or articulate his constitutional objections with the specificity and clarity that he did in the Appellate Division or in this Court."
- "Moreover, because of the dearth of New York precedent concerning inmate hunger strikes, we agree with the Appellate Division that the central issue in the case falls within the exception to the mootness rule since it is novel, likely to recur and, given the exigencies involved in addressing a hunger strike, would typically evade review (see Hearst, supra), as occurred in this case."
- "Accordingly, the Appellate Division did not err in applying the mootness exception."
- "Even assuming the constitutional right he asserts exists and that DOCCS intervention therefore results in the curtailment of such a right, we analyze the propriety of DOCCS action under the test established in Turner v Safley (see Washington v Harper)."
- "Applying this test, the order permitting DOCCS to intervene to prevent Dorsey's death by feeding via nasogastric tube, if necessary, withstands scrutiny."
- "There was no way that DOCCS could effectuate these interests other than to seek a judicial order permitting feeding by nasogastric tube—less intrusive means had been attempted without success."
- "Here, the State sought an order permitting forced feeding because Dorsey's conduct, according to his doctor, had created a substantial risk of imminent death or serious permanent injury."
- "The same cannot be said here where Dorsey, who was a relatively healthy, 241-pound adult before he began the series of hunger strikes that reduced his weight to 145 pounds, has by this conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious permanent injury."
- "Under that standard, "when a policy or regulation impinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights, the action is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" (Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Doe v Coughlin; Matter of Lucas v Scully)."
- "It is therefore evident that DOCCS' decision to intervene when Dorsey's hunger strike progressed to the point that his life was in jeopardy was reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives."
- "Taking action to interrupt an inmate hunger strike not only serves to preserve life and prevent a suicide but also to maintain institutional order and security."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease due process protections compared with the rule in Judge Lippman's dissent.
A competent inmate would have stronger protection against being force-fed under the dissent. The main opinion lets prison officials obtain a court order for feeding by nasogastric tube when the inmate’s refusal creates a substantial risk of imminent death or serious permanent injury and the intervention is reasonably related to prison interests like preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining order. The dissent gives the inmate’s right to refuse treatment more force: the State cannot compel feeding just because it is the inmate’s custodian, but must show either a true basis for overriding that choice, such as preventing suicide, or concrete proof that the refusal conflicts with the safe and efficient running of the prison, and the dissent said that showing was missing here. Because the dissent demands a stronger factual and legal showing before the State can invade an inmate’s body over his objection, it provides more due process protection overall.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule directly governs an incarcerated person's constitutional protection against unwanted medical intervention, plus the preservation and mootness rules for obtaining appellate review of that claim. That is a post-conviction/supervision-stage procedural-and-constitutional protection issue, not a rule about what conduct is criminal or what punishment may be imposed.
See the methodology for more detail.