Majority opinion by Judge Lippman
A state violates due process if it retroactively revokes already-certified businesses’ tax credits when, considering fair warning, reasonable reliance on prior law, the length of the lookback, and the public purpose, the retroactive effect is harsh and oppressive. If the state mainly seeks more revenue, that alone is not enough unless there was an unexpected revenue shortfall.
Also joined by Graffeo, Pigott, Read, and Rivera.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Retroactive application of a tax statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when, considering the taxpayer's forewarning of legislative change and the reasonableness of reliance on prior law, the length of the retroactive period, and the public purpose for retroactive application, the retroactive effect is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limits; absent an unexpected loss of revenue, raising money for the state budget is not by itself a sufficiently compelling public purpose to justify retroactivity where the other factors weigh against the State. 2. Under General Municipal Law § 959, 5 NYCRR 11.9 (c)'s limitation of decertification review under the 1:1 benefit-cost test to business annual reports filed from 2001 through 2007 does not conflict with the statute where the statute is ambiguous, authorizes review of at least three business annual reports, and does not specifically require review of all available reports; the Department of Economic Development's rational interpretation is therefore valid, and a decertification based on that review is not arbitrary and capricious.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "The courts must examine, "in light of 'the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid' [whether] the retroactivity of the law is 'so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation' " (Replan, quoting Welch v Henry)."
- "In Replan, this Court laid out a multi-factor balancing-of-equities test to determine whether a retroactive tax infringes on a taxpayer's due process rights (see)."
- "The important factors in determining whether a retroactive tax transgresses the constitutional limitation are"
- "(1) "the taxpayer's forewarning of a change in the legislation and the reasonableness of . . . reliance on the old law,""
- "In terms of "the taxpayer's forewarning of a change in the legislation and the reasonableness of his reliance on the old law" (Replan), the plaintiffs had no warning and no opportunity at any time in 2008 to alter their behavior in anticipation of the impact of the 2009 Amendments."
- "Plaintiffs appeared to have conducted their business affairs in a manner consistent with existing Program requirements in 2008, justifiably relying on the receipt of the tax benefits that were then in effect."
- "Therefore, the first Replan factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs."
- "(2) "the length of the retroactive period," and"
- "The second factor, the length of the period of retroactivity, also benefits plaintiffs."
- "Regardless of whether the period of retroactivity is deemed to span 16 or 32 months, the length of retroactivity should be considered excessive and weighs against the State."
- "While one year of retroactivity is not considered excessive according to Replan, the period of retroactivity was long enough in the present case so that plaintiffs gained a reasonable expectation that they would "secure repose" in the existing tax scheme (Replan [internal quotation marks omitted])."
- "(3) "the public purpose for retroactive application" (id.)."
- "On the third factor, dispositive in this case, the State fails to set forth a valid public purpose for the retroactive application of the 2009 Amendments."
- "The legislature did not have an important public purpose to make the law retroactive."
- "The legislature's only purposes were to stem abuses in the Empire Zones Program (increasing the benefits to the public relative to the cost of the credits) and to increase tax receipts."
- "The taxpayer's insufficient reliance in United States v Carlton can be contrasted because the retroactive effect of the tax deduction was to correct an error made by Congress that created a "significant and unanticipated revenue loss" ."
- "The main purpose of the 2009 Amendments was to increase tax receipts for the state budget."
- "Furthermore, raising money for the state budget is not a particularly compelling justification."
- "Absent an unexpected loss of revenue, such a legislative purpose is insufficient to warrant retroactivity in a case where the other factors militate against it, as is the situation here."
- "Raising funds is the underlying purpose of taxation and such a rationale would justify every retroactive tax law, obviating the balancing test itself."
- "On its cross appeal, WL argues that 5 NYCRR 11.9 (c), DED's regulation to limit its review to a Program participant's business annual reports filed between 2001 and 2007 for decertification purposes, is inconsistent with the wording of the statute."
- "We conclude that DED's regulation does not conflict with the statutory directive in General Municipal Law § 959 to consider an Empire Zone business's "total" performance."
- "General Municipal Law § 959 (a) (v) (6) provides that one of the criteria for decertification is that "the business enterprise has failed to provide economic returns to the state in the form of total remuneration to its employees (i.e. wages and benefits) and investments in its facility greater in value to the tax benefits the business enterprise used and had refunded to it.""
- "Additionally, section 959 (w) provides that the Commissioner may base decertification on a review of at least three BARs."
- "While it is arguable whether this requirement was meant to prevent businesses operating for fewer than three years from being decertified, the statute did not specifically require that the DED look at all available BARs in making a decertification decision under the 1:1 benefit-cost test."
- "First of all, the word "total" can be read to modify "remuneration to its employees.""
- "The responsible agency, DED, gave the ambiguous statute a rational interpretation that was not inconsistent with the plain language (see Matter of Brown v Wing [determining that it is "proper to utilize a rational interpretation by the agency responsible for administering the statute"])."
- "Though it may have been more precise to start recognizing investments made on or after May 16, 2000, the inception date of the Program, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the DED to choose to commence recognition of investments as of January 1, 2001 (the beginning of the first full year of the Program)."
- "Therefore, the DED could rationally decide to tally investments beginning in 2001 and its decertification of WL was not arbitrary and capricious."
How we compared the opinions
Ability to challenge assessments and obtain refunds
Our checks could not confirm a direction for this subarea, so we do not show the AI's reasoning for this opinion's direction on it. That does not mean the case had no effect.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as ability to challenge assessments and obtain refunds:
The retroactive-tax portion of the rule sets the due-process standard for when taxpayers can invalidate retroactive tax application, so it directly governs the standard for challenging a tax and obtaining relief.
See the methodology for more detail.