Majority opinion by Judge Graffeo
A court should not throw out an insured’s coverage claim at the outset when an SEC payment to give up improper gains may largely reflect others’ profits and the settlement order does not conclusively show it was the insured’s own improper gain. A finding that the insured acted willfully alone does not bar coverage; that bar applies only if the insured meant to injure others.
Also joined by Pigott, Read, Rivera, and Smith.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. The public policy exception for intentionally harmful conduct is narrow: insurance coverage is barred only if the insured not only acted intentionally but also acted with the intent to harm or injure others; a finding that the insured acted willfully does not by itself establish that bar. 2. The rule precluding insurance coverage for disgorgement applies only when the insured seeks indemnity for disgorgement of its own illicit gains; where the insured alleges that the disgorgement payment was based in large part on profits of others and the documentary evidence does not conclusively link the payment to money the insured itself improperly earned, a CPLR 3211 dismissal of the coverage claim is not warranted.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "But the public policy exception for intentionally harmful conduct is a narrow one, under which it must be established not only that the insured acted intentionally but, further, that it acted with the intent to harm or injure others (see Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v Goldfarb ["Whether such coverage is permissible depends upon whether the insured, in committing his criminal act, intended to cause injury"])."
- "Second, as a matter of public policy, an insured may not seek coverage when it engages in conduct "with the intent to cause injury" (Town of Massena v Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co.; see also Austro v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. ["Indemnification agreements are unenforceable as violative of public policy only to the extent that they purport to indemnify a party for damages flowing from the intentional causation of injury"])."
- "The SEC order, while undoubtedly finding Bear Stearns' numerous securities laws violations to be willful, does not conclusively demonstrate that Bear Stearns also had the requisite intent to cause harm."
- "Others have emphasized that public policy prohibits an insured from receiving indemnification for the disgorgement of its own illicit gains (see Bank of the W. v Superior Ct., 2 Cal 4th 1254, 1269 ["Otherwise, the wrongdoer would retain the proceeds of his illegal acts, merely shifting his loss to an insurer"])."
- "It submits that the rule precluding coverage for disgorgement should apply only where the insured requests coverage for the disgorgement of its own illicit gains."
- "In other words, they directly implicated the policy rationale for precluding indemnity for disgorgement—to prevent the unjust enrichment of the insured by allowing it to, in effect, retain the ill-gotten gains by transferring the loss to its carrier."
- "In this case, in contrast, Bear Stearns alleges that it is not pursuing recoupment for the turnover of its own improperly acquired profits and, therefore, it would not be unjustly enriched by securing indemnity."
- "Bear Stearns asserted that its claims all fell within the definition of Loss and alleged that a substantial portion of the SEC disgorgement payment ($140 million) represented illicit profits obtained by its hedge fund customers rather than gains enjoyed by Bear Stearns itself."
- "Bear Stearns does not disagree with these principles, but urges that they do not prohibit coverage here since the bulk of the disgorgement payment—approximately $140 million—represented the improper profits acquired by third-party hedge fund customers, not revenue that Bear Stearns itself pocketed."
- "Put differently, Bear Stearns alleges that much of the payment, although labeled disgorgement by the SEC, did not actually represent the disgorgement of its own profits."
- "Hence, at this CPLR 3211 stage, the documentary evidence does not decisively repudiate Bear Stearns' allegation that the SEC disgorgement payment amount was calculated in large measure on the profits of others."
- "And to prevail on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), the moving party (here, the Insurers) must establish that the documentary evidence "conclusively refutes" the plaintiff's allegations (AG Capital Funding)."
- "Contrary to the Insurers' position, the SEC order does not establish that the $160 million disgorgement payment was predicated on moneys that Bear Stearns itself improperly earned as a result of its securities violations."
- "On the record before us, we agree with Bear Stearns that the Insurers are not entitled to dismissal of its coverage claim premised on the SEC disgorgement payment."
- "Consequently, at this early juncture, we conclude that the Insurers are not entitled to dismissal of Bear Stearns' insurance claims related to the SEC disgorgement payment."