Majority opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam
Throwing out an indictment for misconduct in the grand jury is a rare remedy and requires misconduct that undermined the process and might have changed the decision to indict. A prosecutor’s isolated argument that a witness the defendant asked for is irrelevant is not enough when the jurors hear the request and are correctly told they may decide for themselves whether to call the witness.
Also joined by Graffeo, Pigott, and Read.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Dismissal of an indictment for grand jury misconduct under CPL 210.35 (5) is an exceptional remedy available only in the rare case where prosecutorial misconduct impairs the integrity of the proceeding and may prejudice the defendant—meaning that, absent the misconduct, the grand jury might have decided not to indict; isolated missteps, including a prosecutor's forceful argument that a witness requested by the defendant under CPL 190.50 (6) is irrelevant, do not warrant dismissal when the request is presented to the grand jury and the jurors are accurately told that they may decide for themselves whether to call the witness.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "The court may enforce these statutory rules by dismissing an indictment that "fails to conform to the requirements of [CPL article 190] to such degree that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result" (CPL 210.35 [5]; see CPL 210.20 [1] [c]; Hill)."
- "The "exceptional remedy of dismissal" is available in "rare cases" of prosecutorial misconduct upon a showing that, in the absence of the complained-of misconduct, the grand jury might have decided not to indict the defendant (Huston)."
- "In general, this demanding test is met only where the prosecutor engages in an "over-all pattern of bias and misconduct" that is "pervasive" and typically willful, whereas isolated instances of misconduct, including the erroneous handling of evidentiary matters, do not merit invalidation of the indictment (id. at 408, 409-410; see Pelchat). "[T]he statutory test, which does not turn on mere flaw, error or skewing . . . is very precise and very high" (People v Darby)."
- "At most, the prosecutors made isolated missteps that could not have affected the outcome of the grand jury proceeding."
- "In addition, the defendant may specifically ask the grand jury to exercise its power to call a witness of his or her selection and "[t]he grand jury may as a matter of discretion grant such request and cause such witness to be called" (CPL 190.50 [6])."
- "It is true that the lead prosecutor forcefully contended that the witness's testimony would be irrelevant, analogizing defendant's proffer to a plea for the testimony of random members of the community at large."
- "However, there was nothing inherently impermissible about the prosecutor's suggestion that the potential witness had no relevant testimony to offer and the dissent does not appear to take a contrary position."
- "The prosecutors allowed defendant to submit his request directly to the grand jurors and defendant told the grand jurors at considerable length why he thought the witness's testimony to be relevant and worthwhile."
- "Once defendant had completed his exhortation to call the witness, the prosecutors repeatedly acknowledged that the grand jurors could vote to hear from the witness and that the witness would be "subpoenaed if twelve or more of [them] vote[d]" to do so. "[A]s a matter of [their] discretion," the grand jurors then independently refused to "grant such request," thus exercising their prerogative under CPL 190.50 (6)."
- "In any case, the lead prosecutor clarified that, despite her objections, the grand jurors had the right to call the witness based on their own belief regarding the relevance of the potential witness's testimony."
- "Given those accurate instructions, the prosecutor's argument that the proposed testimony was irrelevant could not have misled the grand jurors into believing that they had no choice but to agree with her."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease due process protections compared with the rule in Judge Lippman's dissent.
A person accused of a crime would get more protection under the dissent because prosecutors could not steer the grand jury away from hearing a witness the accused asks it to call and still keep the indictment unless the misconduct was truly extreme. The main rule makes dismissal a rare remedy: even forceful prosecutorial comments that a witness is irrelevant do not require throwing out the indictment if the request is put to the grand jurors, they are told they can decide for themselves, and the misconduct likely did not affect the result. The dissent is stricter: it says the grand jury—not the prosecutor—must decide whether to call that witness, and misleading statements about relevance, about who has that power, or withholding basic information needed for that choice can itself taint the proceeding. Because the dissent more readily invalidates an indictment when prosecutors interfere with the grand jury’s independent role, it places greater procedural limits on the state and gives defendants stronger due-process protection.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule sets the threshold for dismissing an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings, directly governing the procedural protection against unfair or integrity-impaired charging proceedings.
See the methodology for more detail.