Majority opinion by Judge Jenny Rivera
New York courts read a trust indenture’s no-action clause narrowly by its exact words. If the clause bars suits only under “this indenture” and does not mention “the securities,” it bars only contract claims based on the indenture, not a securityholder’s independent common-law or statutory claims.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Graffeo, Lippman, Pigott, Read, and Smith.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Under New York law, a trust indenture no-action clause is strictly construed according to its plain language, and a clause that bars actions or proceedings upon, under, or with respect to “this Indenture,” but does not refer to “the Securities,” bars only indenture-based contractual claims and does not bar a securityholder’s independent common-law or statutory claims.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "In construing a contract we look to its language, for "a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Greenfield v Philles Records; accord J. D'Addario & Co., Inc. v Embassy Indus., Inc.; Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison Realty Co.; W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri; Nichols v Nichols)."
- "As the case law further establishes, we read a no-action clause to give effect to the precise words and language used, for the clause must be "strictly construed" (Cruden v Bank of N.Y. [citation omitted]; cf. Feldbaum, *7-8, 1992 Del Ch LEXIS 113, *25, 18 Del J Corp L at 645; Lange, at *7, 2002 Del Ch LEXIS 101 at *20-22; Cruden v Bank of N.Y., *12, *35 [SD NY, Sept. 4, 1990, Nos. 85 Civ. 4170 (JFK), 85 Civ. 4219 (JFK), 85 Civ. 4570 (JFK), 87 Civ. 5493 (JFK)]; Victor v Riklis, *6 n 7, *20 n 7 [SD NY, May 15, 1992, No. 91 Civ. 2897 (LJF)]; McMahan & Co. v Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc.)."
- "The clear and unambiguous text of this no-action clause, with its specific reference to the indenture, on its face limits the clause to the contract rights recognized by the indenture agreement itself."
- "Here, unlike the Feldbaum and Lange clauses, the Athilon no-action clause omits the phrase "or the Securities," indicating its coverage is limited to the indenture and rights thereunder."
- "Here, the Athilon no-action clause when strictly construed and afforded its plain meaning, makes no reference to the securities and therefore does not apply to claims arising outside the scope of the indenture."
- "In response to the first certified question from the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, we conclude that a trust indenture's "no-action" clause that specifically precludes enforcement of contractual claims arising under the indenture, but omits reference to "the Securities," does not bar a securityholder's independent common-law or statutory claims."