Majority opinion by Judge Read
If a guilty-plea conviction was already final before defense lawyers were constitutionally required to warn noncitizen clients about deportation risk, the defendant cannot reopen it in a state postconviction motion based on getting no such warning.
Also joined by Graffeo, Pigott, and Smith.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Under Teague v Lane, as adopted in People v Eastman, new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively on collateral review unless they fall within a recognized exception; Padilla v Kentucky created a new rule, not merely an application of Strickland v Washington, and it is not a watershed rule, so it does not apply retroactively in CPL 440.10 proceedings. 2. Under People v Pepper's three-factor retroactivity test—examining the purpose of the new standard, reliance on the old standard, and the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice—current constitutional standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence will be applied retroactively, but decisions that are only collateral to or relatively far removed from the fact-finding process at trial apply prospectively only; because Padilla concerns advice about immigration consequences rather than guilt or innocence, and the reliance and administration-of-justice factors also weigh against retroactivity, Padilla is not retroactive on collateral review.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "The Appellate Division employed the framework described by the Supreme Court in Teague v Lane and adopted by us in People v Eastman to analyze whether Padilla should be applied retroactively ."
- "Teague established as a guiding principle that new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases that had become final on direct review before the new rule was announced (see Whorton v Bockting ["Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review"])."
- "The Teague court also fashioned two exceptions to this general rule."
- "First, "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" ( [internal quotation marks omitted])."
- "The second exception was "reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure" (id.), defined generally as "those new procedures [of fundamental fairness] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished" (id. at 313)."
- "We then proceeded to evaluate Eastman's motion in light of Teague."
- "The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed, holding that, under the Teague framework, Padilla does not apply in collateral challenges to final convictions."
- "Rather, she explained, "Padilla did something more. Before deciding if failing to provide such advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Padilla considered a threshold question: Was advice about deportation categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a collateral consequence of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence? In other words, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied ('Did this attorney act unreasonably?'), Padilla asked whether the Strickland test applied ('Should we even evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?'). And [because] . . . that preliminary question about Strickland's ambit came to the Padilla Court unsettled[,] . . . the Court's answer ('Yes, Strickland governs here') required a new rule" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted])."
- "In sum, Justice Kagan concluded, the lower federal and state appellate courts "almost uniformly insisted on what Padilla called the 'categorica[l] remov[al]' of advice about a conviction's non-criminal consequences—including deportation—from the Sixth Amendment's scope"; Padilla was the first case to "reject[ ] that categorical approach—and so [make] the Strickland test operative—when a criminal lawyer gives (or fails to give) advice about immigration consequences"; therefore, Padilla announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague (568 US at —)."
- "The majority determined that Padilla was a new rule and not just an application of the two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel to a new set of facts."
- "We agree with Justice Kagan that "[i]f [this] does not count as 'break[ing] new ground' or 'impos[ing] a new obligation,' we are hard pressed to know what would" (Chaidez, 568 US at —, quoting Teague)."
- "Equally, given the Supreme Court's now extensive precedent, we are confident that Padilla does not qualify for Teague's watershed exception."
- "Thus, Padilla created a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure in New York which, consistent with Teague and Eastman, does not apply retroactively in CPL 440.10 proceedings."
- "Seeking a balance between "full retroactive application (permitting a collateral attack on a conviction no longer in normal appellate channels)" and "limit[ing] relief to prospective police conduct or trials" , the Pepper court adopted the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker and recapitulated in Stovall v Denno and Desist ."
- "The Pepper test requires us to "weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new standard; the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard. The second and third factors are, however, only given substantial weight 'when the answer to the retroactivity question is not to be found in the purpose of the new rule itself. Thus, where otherwise there could be a complete miscarriage of justice, current constitutional standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence have been substituted for those in effect at the time of trial' " (Policano v Herbert [citation omitted], quoting Pepper)."
- "Under the first and most important factor, "current constitutional standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence" will be applied retroactively, but "decisions which are only collateral to or relatively far removed from the fact-finding process at trial" apply prospectively only (Pepper)."
- "Padilla has nothing to do with a reliable determination of guilt or innocence; rather, Padilla assures that noncitizen defendants appreciate the immigration risks that inhere in guilty pleas to crimes they acknowledge during the plea allocution to having committed."
- "As to the remaining two Pepper factors—i.e., reliance on the old standard and the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice—here again our decision in Ford looms large."
- "But in light of Ford (and McDonald), many others were likely reluctant to volunteer advice in an often complex area of law outside their legal specialty."
- "And those who did would have had no reason to create or maintain records to memorialize conversations with their clients on this topic."
- "Courts would have to make factual findings based on off-the-record conversations years after a plea, based on faded memories."
- "Such considerations, coupled with the sheer volume of prosecutions disposed of by guilty plea (see Missouri v Frye ["(N)inety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas"]), weigh heavily against retroactive application of Padilla."
- "The Pepper factors disfavor retroactivity, too."
- "Accordingly, the Appellate Division's order should be reversed and the Supreme Court order reinstated."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
This majority opinion was compared separately with each of the other opinions in this case. Every comparison pointed in the same direction, so that shared direction is shown above. Below is the AI's reasoning for each comparison.
Compared with Judge Lippman's dissent:
Noncitizen defendants who pleaded guilty before Padilla would get a real chance, under the dissent, to undo pleas entered without understanding the deportation risk; under the main opinion, they do not. The main opinion holds that Padilla cannot be used retroactively in a CPL 440.10 postconviction motion, so an older conviction generally stands even if counsel gave no immigration warning. The dissent instead says a plea is not knowing and voluntary when a noncitizen was unaware it carried a substantial risk of deportation, and that this rule applies to old pleas as a matter of fundamental fairness. That gives defendants more procedural protection because it opens postconviction review for final convictions and requires the plea process to do more to ensure an informed, valid guilty plea.
Compared with Judge Rivera's dissent:
Noncitizen defendants with old guilty pleas would have a much better chance to reopen those convictions under the dissent. The main rule says Padilla’s requirement that defense lawyers advise clients about deportation consequences does not apply in a postconviction challenge to a final conviction, because Padilla announced a new rule and is not retroactive; the dissent says Padilla was just an application of the existing ineffective-assistance standard and therefore should apply retroactively in state court collateral review. The dissent also rejects the majority’s focus on finality and administrative burden, and instead makes fairness, just treatment of defendants, and confidence in the justice system the main retroactivity concerns. Because that approach allows more defendants to seek vacatur of guilty pleas entered without constitutionally adequate advice, it gives defendants more procedural protection.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule directly governs retroactivity and availability of a federal constitutional criminal-procedure protection on CPL 440.10 collateral review, determining whether defendants can obtain post-conviction relief based on Padilla. That is a post-conviction/criminal-procedure issue, not a rule about what conduct is criminal or what punishment applies.
See the methodology for more detail.
Noncitizen access & protections
This majority opinion was compared separately with each of the other opinions in this case. Every comparison pointed in the same direction, so that shared direction is shown above. Below is the AI's reasoning for each comparison.
Compared with Judge Lippman's dissent:
Noncitizens with older guilty pleas would get a real chance to reopen convictions that may lead to deportation under the dissent. The main opinion says Padilla’s rule—that defense lawyers must warn noncitizen clients about immigration consequences—does not apply retroactively in a CPL 440.10 postconviction motion, so people whose pleas became final before Padilla generally cannot use that rule to undo the plea. The dissent takes the opposite view: it would apply Padilla to earlier pleas too, and would treat a plea as not knowing and voluntary if the person entered it unaware that it carried a substantial risk of deportation. That gives noncitizens more access to New York courts and more protection against the immigration fallout of past convictions, because it opens a path to challenge pleas that the main opinion would leave untouched.
Compared with Judge Rivera's dissent:
Noncitizens with old guilty pleas would have a much better chance to reopen those convictions if their lawyers never warned them about deportation. The main opinion closes that path by saying Padilla cannot be used retroactively in a later state postconviction challenge to a final conviction, but the dissent would allow Padilla to apply retroactively and let state courts revisit those pleas. That difference matters directly to immigration consequences: if a plea can be challenged or vacated because counsel failed to give required immigration advice, the noncitizen has more protection against removal and a stronger chance to preserve the ability to remain in New York and keep access to work, family, and other legal protections.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as noncitizen access & protections:
The rule directly limits noncitizen defendants’ access to a state postconviction protection: it makes Padilla-based ineffective-assistance claims about immigration-consequence advice unavailable on collateral review for final convictions. Because that protection is specifically tied to immigration risks from guilty pleas, the rule affects access to legal protections and exposure to immigration consequences.
See the methodology for more detail.