Majority opinion by Judge Lippman
To claim ineffective assistance based on a lawyer’s failure to request the mandatory missing-evidence instruction, a defendant must show prejudice from that failure and facts making it at least reasonably plausible that the lost evidence would have supported an inference against the prosecution.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Graffeo, Pigott, Read, Rivera, and Smith.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
After People v Handy—which held that an adverse inference charge is mandatory on request when a defendant in a criminal case, acting with due diligence, demanded evidence reasonably likely to be of material importance and that evidence has been destroyed by the State—the viability of an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request that charge depends, in crucial part, on a showing of prejudice attributable to counsel’s inadequacy and facts making the adverse inference at least reasonably plausible.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "It was in Handy that we first held such a charge to be mandatory upon request "when a defendant in a criminal case, acting with due diligence, demand[ed] evidence . . . reasonably likely to be of material importance and that evidence ha[d] been destroyed by the State" (id. at 665)."
- "We do not exclude the possibility that, post-Handy, the failure to request a Handy charge could support an ineffective assistance claim."
- "But the viability of such a claim, conditioned upon a demonstration of prejudice attributable to counsel's inadequacy (see Strickland; People v Caban), would depend, in crucial part, upon facts making the adverse inference Handy merely makes available at least reasonably plausible."