Unsigned opinion of the court
When the intermediate appeals court suppresses evidence because it independently drew a different inference from established facts about reasonable suspicion for a stop, prosecutors cannot appeal that ruling to the state's highest court, because reasonable suspicion is a mixed law-and-fact question, not a law-only ruling.
Joined by Abdus-Salaam, Fahey, Lippman, Read, Rivera, and Stein.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Whether the circumstances of a particular case rise to the level of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact; accordingly, when the Appellate Division reverses a suppression ruling because, in exercising its independent fact-finding powers, it draws a different inference from the established facts, the reversal is not "on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to reversal" within CPL 450.90 (2) (a), and an appeal to this Court is not authorized.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Whether the circumstances of a particular case rise to the level of reasonable suspicion presents a mixed question of law and fact (see e.g. People v Howard [dismissing an appeal from an Appellate Division order of reversal involving the mixed question of whether the police harbored a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was about to commit a crime])."
- "Here, by contrast, the Appellate Division reversed the suppression court because, when exercising its independent fact-finding powers, it drew a different inference from the established facts, thus deciding a mixed question of law and fact."
- "Because the Appellate Division's reversals were thus not "on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to reversal" (CPL 450.90 [2] [a]), these appeals are not authorized to be taken."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would increase due process protections compared with the rule in Judge Pigott's dissent.
The dissent would make it easier for police to justify a forcible stop and easier for prosecutors to undo a suppression ruling that favored the accused. The main opinion says this kind of reasonable-suspicion dispute is a mixed law-and-fact question, so the Court of Appeals cannot hear the People’s appeal here; as a result, the Appellate Division’s suppression ruling stands. The dissent, by contrast, treats the issue as a legal one reviewable by the high court and says that running away while looking back, combined with officers’ knowledge of one man’s past similar crimes and the other’s association with similar offenders, was enough for reasonable suspicion when viewed as a whole. That approach gives the state more room to defend stops and preserve evidence from them, which means less procedural protection for defendants against unjustified detention and against the use of evidence obtained after such stops.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
This rule controls whether the People may obtain Court of Appeals review of an Appellate Division suppression ruling based on reasonable suspicion, so it directly affects criminal-procedure review in a search-and-seizure context.
See the methodology for more detail.