Majority opinion by Judge Lippman
Unless there is a substantial justification, a judge may not question a witness outside defense counsel’s presence about matters that affect trial issues, including credibility. If the witness’s mental or physical condition could affect credibility rather than just scheduling, defense counsel must be present, and excluding them is a constitutional error that cannot be dismissed as harmless.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Read, Rivera, and Stein.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Absent a substantial justification, a court must not examine a witness in camera or ex parte about nonministerial matters; when the discussion concerns a substantive issue for trial, including information bearing on the witness's credibility rather than a purely scheduling or administrative matter, defense counsel's presence is required. 2. The denial of the right to counsel at trial is of constitutional dimension and is not subject to harmless-error analysis; courts should not determine the issue by calculating prejudice or speculating about what counsel might have obtained had counsel been present.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Absent a substantial justification, courts must not examine witnesses about nonministerial matters in camera without counsel present or ex parte (see People v Contreras; People v Goggins). "[A]n in-camera examination of the witnesses, that is ex parte or without the parties represented would, in our view, arguably trifle with the constitutional right to confrontation and the right to counsel" (Goggins)."
- "Goggins concerned a defendant's right to disclosure of an informant's identity and this Court held that where the information "relates to a substantive issue in the case, the disclosure should not be ex parte or without either party present even if in camera" (id. at 173)."
- "Because the discussion involved important issues for trial that might have affected a "substantial right" of a party, defense counsels' presence was required (see Rules Governing Judicial Conduct [22 NYCRR] § 100.3 [B] [6] [a]; Contreras; Goggins)."
- "Unlike a "purely administrative, ministerial question" (see dissenting op at 116), the court's discussion with Mr. Rose concerned potentially significant evidence that defense counsel may have found useful during cross-examination at trial."
- "As the in camera discussion concerned a witness's health (both mental and physical) and credibility, issues the court knew defense counsel would address during cross-examination of the witness at trial, it was much more than a scheduling matter and it violated defendants' right to counsel for Supreme Court to deny defense counsel physical access to the proceeding and to refuse to create a record of the proceeding for use in cross-examination (see Contreras; Goggins; Frost; Ortega; Stincer)."
- "The denial of the right to counsel at trial "is of constitutional dimension" and is not subject to harmless error analysis (Hodge; People v Hilliard)."
- "This Court responded that "the test must be not what the hearing did not produce, but what it might have produced if the defendant's right to counsel had not been ignored" (id. at 321). "[T]he result of such inquiry would have to be pure speculation" (id.)."
- "As this Court recognized, "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial" (Felder [internal quotation marks and citation omitted])."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would increase due process protections compared with the rule in Judge Fahey's dissent.
Criminal defendants would get less protection under the dissent because it would let a judge question a prosecution witness outside the defense’s presence when the judge views the issue as only scheduling or administration, so long as no substantial right seems affected, no side gains an unfair advantage, and the parties are later told what happened and allowed to respond. The main opinion is stricter: when the discussion touches a trial issue such as the witness’s health as it relates to credibility, defense counsel must be present, and excluding counsel is a constitutional right-to-counsel violation that requires a new trial without asking whether the error was harmless. That difference matters because the dissent allows the court and prosecution to handle some witness-related issues without real-time adversarial participation by the defense, reducing the procedural safeguards defendants have to test credibility and protect the fairness of the trial.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule directly governs a criminal trial-procedure protection: defense counsel must be present for in camera or ex parte witness questioning on substantive trial matters, and denial of that right to counsel requires reversal without harmless-error analysis.
See the methodology for more detail.