Majority opinion by Judge Lippman
Destroying one original with intent to revoke cancels the will even if other originals still exist. If the original the deceased kept cannot be found after a thorough search, revocation is strongly presumed, and anyone offering another original for probate must rebut that presumption; the probate court should require the other originals to be produced.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Read, Rivera, and Stein.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Revocation of a will by a subsequent will or other writing may be accomplished only if the revoking instrument is executed with the formalities prescribed for the execution and attestation of a will. 2. A will may be revoked by the testator's act of destroying it with revocatory intent, and that act is effective even if will duplicates remain outstanding; when a will once possessed by the testator cannot be found after death despite a thorough search, revocation by destruction is strongly presumed, and the will's proponent must rebut that presumption as a condition of probate. 3. When it is brought to the surrogate's attention that there are duplicates of a will presented for probate, the surrogate should require the duplicates to be presented, not to admit them as separate instruments to probate, but to determine whether the will has been revoked and whether each duplicate completely contains the testator's will.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 3-4.1 (a) (1) (B), particularly as we have construed it in Matter of Coffed , commands categorically that revocation of a will by a subsequent will or other writing may be accomplished only by executing the revoking instrument "with the formalities prescribed . . . for the execution and attestation of a will.""
- "A will may, of course, be revoked not only by means of a writing executed in the manner of a will, but by the testator's act of destroying it with revocatory intent (EPTL 3-4.1 [a] [2] [A] [i]), which act achieves the revocatory purpose even if there remain will duplicates outstanding (Crossman v Crossman)."
- "That a testator has in fact revoked a will by destruction is strongly presumed where the will, although once possessed by the testator, cannot be found posthumously despite a thorough search (Matter of Fox; Matter of Staiger; Matter of Kennedy)."
- "The presumption, once raised, "stands in the place of positive proof" (Staiger) and must be rebutted by the will's proponent as a condition of probate (Matter of Fox)."
- "It is precisely to avoid such an incongruous outcome that the governing rule of proceeding has long been that "[a]s soon as it is brought to the attention of the surrogate that there are duplicates of a will presented to him for probate, it is proper that he should require [the] duplicates to be presented, not for the purpose of admitting [them] as separate instruments to probate, but that he may be assured whether the will has been revoked and whether each completely contains the will of the testator" (Crossman; and see e.g. Matter of Robinson; Matter of Blackstone)."