Majority opinion by Judge Pigott
A pregnant woman cannot be convicted of second-degree manslaughter for her own reckless conduct during pregnancy that injures the fetus in the womb, even if the baby is later born alive and dies from those injuries. State law makes only intentional maternal conduct toward the fetus criminal.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Lippman, Rivera, and Stein.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Under the current statutory scheme, Penal Law §§ 125.05 (1) and 125.15 (1) do not make a pregnant woman criminally liable for manslaughter in the second degree for reckless conduct with respect to herself and her unborn fetus that injures the fetus in utero, even if the child is later born alive and dies from those injuries; the legislature has criminalized such maternal conduct only when it is intentional.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "We hold that it is evident from the statutory scheme that the legislature, in enacting Penal Law §§ 125.05 (1) and 125.15 (1), did not intend to hold pregnant women criminally responsible for conduct with respect to themselves and their unborn fetuses unless such conduct is done intentionally."
- "Under the current statutory scheme, the answer to this question is no."
- "The sole issue that we reach on this appeal, however, is whether a woman can be convicted of manslaughter for reckless conduct that she engaged in while pregnant that caused injury to the fetus in utero where the child was born alive but died as a result of that injury days later (see People v Martinez)."
- "Both "self-abortion" statutes require the mens rea of intent and, yet, the legislature has determined that the punishment for such intentional conduct is no greater than a misdemeanor."
- "We conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose greater punishment on pregnant women for their alleged reckless conduct toward a fetus than for their intentional conduct."
How we compared the opinions
Criminal liability & punishment
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease criminal liability & punishment compared with the rule in Judge Fahey's dissent.
A pregnant woman could face a second-degree manslaughter conviction for reckless conduct during pregnancy if the baby is later born alive and dies from those injuries under the dissent, while the main opinion says New York’s current statutes do not allow that charge. The key difference is that the dissent treats the child as a legally protected “person” once born alive, even though the mother’s reckless act happened before birth, and it sees no pregnant-mother exception in the manslaughter statute. The main opinion instead reads the overall statute to mean that, for a mother’s conduct toward herself and her fetus, the legislature has made only intentional conduct criminal in this setting, not reckless conduct. That makes the dissent broader and harsher because it turns prenatal reckless behavior that the main opinion would not punish as manslaughter into conduct that can support a homicide conviction.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as criminal liability & punishment:
The rule directly defines the scope of criminal liability for homicide-related conduct by holding that reckless prenatal maternal conduct is not prosecutable as second-degree manslaughter under the cited statutes, while indicating that only intentional maternal conduct has been criminalized. That is a substantive limit on what conduct may be treated as criminal and on resulting punishment exposure.
See the methodology for more detail.