Majority opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam
A person can challenge a land-use approval under New York's environmental review law when the project directly causes that person a specific harm different in kind or degree from the public at large. The harm need not be unique, so the challenge is not barred just because other nearby residents are directly harmed too.
Also joined by Fahey, Lippman, Pigott, Rivera, and Stein.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
In land use matters, including under the State Environmental Quality Review Act, a petitioner satisfies the special-injury requirement for standing by alleging a direct, particularized harm that is different in kind or degree from that suffered by the public at large; the harm must be specific to the petitioner, but it need not be unique, and standing is not defeated merely because the challenged action directly harms multiple people.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "In Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , this Court examined the law of standing and set forth a framework for deciding whether parties have standing to challenge governmental action in land use matters generally and under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [SEQRA]), specifically."
- "We held in Society of Plastics that "[i]n land use matters . . . the plaintiff, for standing purposes, must show that it would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large" ."
- "Here, petitioner Marvin is not alleging an indirect, collateral effect from the increased train noise that will be experienced by the public at large, but rather a particularized harm that may also be inflicted upon others in the community who live near the tracks."
- "The harm that is alleged must be specific to the individuals who allege it and must be "different in kind or degree from the public at large" (Society of Plastics at 778), but it need not be unique."
- "This example is distinctly different from the situation here where more than one resident is directly impacted by the noise created from increased train traffic."
- "That more than one person may be harmed does not defeat standing, as we found in Save the Pine Bush where we held that the nine individual petitioners who alleged that they lived near the site of the proposed project and "use[d] the Pine Bush for recreation and to study and enjoy the unique habitat found there," have standing (see generally United States v Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures [SCRAP] ["(W)e have . . . made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury . . . To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody"])."
- "The number of people who are affected by the challenged action is not dispositive of standing."