Majority opinion by Judge Jenny Rivera
A sentencing judge cannot delay payment of a mandatory surcharge at sentencing. After sentencing, a person who still owes it may seek a delay by asking the court to resentence them at any time, even while incarcerated, but incarceration alone cannot prove inability to pay. A person who gets a surcharge summons may ask on the summons date instead.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Fahey, Pigott, and Stein.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Under the statutory scheme governing mandatory surcharges, a sentencing court has no authority at sentencing to defer payment of a mandatory surcharge imposed under Penal Law § 60.35. 2. After sentencing, any person with an unpaid mandatory surcharge may seek deferral by moving for resentencing under CPL 420.10 (5) at any time, including during incarceration, but inability to pay may not be found solely because of incarceration; persons subject to a summons under Penal Law § 60.35 (8) may instead seek deferral on the summons appearance date, and all deferral requests are governed by CPL 420.40.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "We agree that a court lacks authority at sentencing to consider a request to defer the mandatory surcharge, but find no statutory support for the People's position that defendant may only seek such relief upon release from confinement."
- "By its terms, CPL 420.40 "governs the deferral of the obligation to pay all or part of a mandatory surcharge . . . imposed pursuant to subdivision one of section 60.35 . . . and financial hardship hearings relating to mandatory surcharges" (CPL 420.40 [1])."
- "Thus, CPL 420.40 and 420.10 together permit any person with an unpaid mandatory surcharge to request a deferral by moving at any time for resentencing pursuant to CPL 420.10 (5), even during a period of incarceration."
- "The resentencing provision states that a court "shall not determine that the defendant is unable to pay . . . solely because of such defendant's incarceration but shall consider all the defendant's sources of income including, but not limited to, moneys in the possession of an inmate at the time of . . . admission into such facility, funds earned by [an inmate] in a work release program . . . , funds earned by [an inmate as compensation for work performed while incarcerated] and any other funds received by [an inmate] or on [the inmate's] behalf and deposited with [personnel] of the facility where the person is confined" (CPL 420.10 [5])."
- "An individual subject to a summons under Penal Law § 60.35 (8) may similarly request a deferral by motion to resentence or, alternatively, may seek this relief at the scheduled summons appearance date, in accordance with the specific procedure set forth in CPL 420.40 (2)."
- "These provisions clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to make the procedure set forth in CPL 420.40 applicable to all deferral requests."