Majority opinion by Judge Stein
An insurer may compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act despite an unfiled workers’ compensation payment agreement if using that federal law would not undermine California’s insurance filing law, and the agreement clearly gives arbitrators authority to decide arbitrability. Unless the resisting party specifically challenges that delegation, arbitrators—not courts—decide arbitrability and enforceability.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, Fahey, Pigott, and Rivera.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. The McCarranferguson Act does not reverse preempt the Federal Arbitration Act in relation to California Insurance Code § 11658 when applying the Federal Arbitration Act would not invalidate, impair, or supersede California insurance law; application of the Federal Arbitration Act does not impair section 11658 where California law does not prohibit, limit, or regulate arbitration clauses in workers' compensation insurance contracts, does not give courts or administrative agencies exclusive jurisdiction over those disputes, and arbitration would not frustrate declared state policy or interfere with California's administrative regime. 2. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a delegation clause is severable from the larger arbitration agreement, and where the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate arbitrability, that delegation must be enforced unless the party resisting arbitration specifically challenges the delegation clause; in that circumstance, arbitrators rather than courts decide gateway questions of arbitrability and enforceability.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Thus, under the McCarranferguson Act, "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance" (15 USC § 1012 [b])."
- "Stated otherwise, "when Congress enacts a law specifically relating to the business of insurance, that law controls," but the McCarranferguson Act precludes application of—or, in other words, reverse preempts—a federal law in the face of a state law regulating the business of insurance where "the federal measure does not 'specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance,' and would 'invalidate, impair or supersede' the State's law" (Humana Inc., quoting Department of Treasury; see 15 USC § 1012 [b])."
- "The relevant analysis is a three-part test, pursuant to which the McCarranferguson Act applies if: (1) the federal statute in question does not specifically relate to insurance; (2) the state law at issue was enacted to regulate the business of insurance; and (3) the federal statute at issue would invalidate, impair or supersede the state law (see 15 USC § 1012 [b]; Humana Inc.). Here, the first two prongs of this test are satisfied—namely, the FAA does not specifically relate to insurance (see Kong v Allied Professional Ins. Co.; Munich Am. Reins. Co. v Crawford; Stephens v American Intl. Ins. Co.) and California Insurance Code § 11658 was enacted to regulate the business of insurance (see generally Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v Moran; Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v Pireno). Thus, whether the McCarranferguson Act applies turns on whether application of the FAA—assuming that it would mandate arbitration here—would "invalidate, impair or supersede" California Insurance Code § 11658 (15 USC § 1012 [b])."
- "Applying the above definitions here, the McCarranferguson Act does not reverse preempt the FAA with respect to California Insurance Code § 11658."
- "In sum, we hold that the FAA applies to the Payment Agreements because it does not "invalidate, impair or supersede" the California Insurance Code or any insurance regulations and, consequently, the McCarranferguson Act is not triggered (15 USC § 1012 [b])."
- "Although the term "impair" broadens the reach of the McCarranferguson Act beyond federal statutes that directly conflict with a state law regulating insurance, "when application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a State's administrative regime, the McCarranferguson Act does not preclude its application" (id. at 310)."
- "This is so because neither section 11658—nor any other California law which has been brought to our attention—would be invalidated, superseded or impaired by application of the FAA inasmuch as California law did not, at the relevant times, prohibit, limit or regulate the use or form of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts."
- "As noted previously, at the times in question here, California law did not—and still does not—prohibit arbitration in the insurance context."
- "By contrast, in the workers' compensation insurance context, California insurance law did not mandate a specific form or content of arbitration clauses or otherwise restrict their use."
- "Nor have the parties alerted us to any California statutes or regulations granting that state's courts or administrative agencies exclusive jurisdiction over insurance disputes (compare State of Wash., Dept. of Transp. v James Riv. Ins. Co., 176 Wash 2d 390, 400; Washburn v Corcoran)."
- "Neither the goal of the statute nor its administrative scheme is undermined by applying the FAA."
- "Significantly, the determination of whether California Insurance Code § 11658 applies to the Payment Agreements—and, if so, the consequences of the failure to file them—will be made pursuant to California law regardless of whether arbitration is compelled."
- "Further, whether this issue is resolved by a court or by arbitrators, the question of whether the failure to file invalidates the Payment Agreements will not be determined by the Department, itself."
- "Thus, permitting arbitration will not undermine the authority of the WCIRB or the Commissioner (cf. Preston [rejecting argument that arbitration of private dispute would undermine role of agency in enforcing statute])."
- "This rule of severability extends to delegation clauses, which are severable from larger arbitration provisions (see Rentacenter, West, Inc.; Parnell v CashCall, Inc.; Brennan v Opus Bank)."
- "Such "delegation clauses" are enforceable where "there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence" that the parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability issues (First Options of Chicago, Inc., quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc.)."
- "Thus, where a contract contains a valid delegation to the arbitrator of the power to determine arbitrability, such a clause will be enforced absent a specific challenge to the delegation clause by the party resisting arbitration (see Rentacenter, West, Inc.)."
- "The Supreme Court has also held that arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms and that "parties can agree to arbitrate 'gateway' questions of 'arbitrability' " (Rentacenter, West, Inc.; see Nitrolift Technologies, L.L.C., 568 US at — Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.)."
- "Those delegation provisions, which state that the arbitrators "have exclusive jurisdiction over the entire matter in dispute, including any question as to its arbitrability," are valid because the parties "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to arbitrate arbitrability (AT&T Technologies, Inc.; see First Options of Chicago, Inc.; Malone v Superior Ct., th 1551, 1560, d 241, 247 [2014]; Gilbert St. Devs., LLC v La Quinta Homes, LLC, th 1185, 1192, d 918, 922-923 [2009])."
- "As the delegation clauses are severable from the remainder of the agreements to arbitrate, we must enforce them according to their terms and, under these circumstances, the question of arbitrability is one for the arbitrators (see Rentacenter, West, Inc.)."
- "Further, because the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability and enforceability of the arbitration clauses to the arbitrators—in provisions that were not specifically challenged by the insureds—the FAA mandates that the arbitration provisions be enforced as written."
- "We, therefore, express no view on whether National Union's failure to file the Payment Agreements rendered the arbitration clauses unenforceable, because that question should be determined by the arbitrators pursuant to the FAA and the parties' agreements to arbitrate arbitrability (see AT&T Technologies, Inc.)."