Majority opinion by Judge Pigott
A landlord’s duty under the city’s lead-paint law arises only if a child age six or younger actually resides in the apartment. Spending substantial time there is not enough by itself; the child must live there with some degree of permanence and a real intent to keep it as a residence, although a child can have more than one residence.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, Garcia, Rivera, and Stein.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Under Local Law 1, a landlord's duty to remove or cover lead-based paint in a dwelling unit is triggered only if a child six years of age and under "resides" there, and "reside" means living in the place with something more than mere physical presence or temporary presence—some length of stay and a bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence with at least some degree of permanency; a person may have more than one residence, but not every place where the person spends substantial time is a residence. 2. In a lead paint poisoning case based on traditional common-law principles and a landlord's contractual duty to repair, a plaintiff must show that the landlord knew that a young child lived in the apartment in order to survive the landlord's motion for summary judgment.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Local Law 1 imposes such a duty, requiring landlords to "remove or cover" lead-based paint "in any dwelling unit in which a child or children six (6) years of age and under reside" (Administrative Code former § 27-2013 [h] [1] [emphasis added])."
- "If, however, the word "reside" requires something more than mere physical presence in a place (as the courts below determined), then Yaniveth did not "reside" in her grandmother's apartment, defendants did not owe a duty under the statute and plaintiffs' negligence claim must fail (see Juarez; Rivera v Nelson Realty, LLC [dismissing plaintiff's complaint where neither the common law nor any statute imposed a duty on landlords to cover radiators in apartments in which young children live])."
- "Although plaintiffs cite Newcomb for the proposition that "[r]esidence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile" (id. at 250), our opinion made clear that "[r]esidence means living in a particular locality," even if a person does not intend to make that place a "fixed and permanent home," i.e., a domicile (id. [emphasis added])."
- "As we stated more recently, a person's "residence" entails "something more than temporary or physical presence," with some "degree of permanence and [an] intention to remain" (Dean v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y.)."
- "Thus, "[a]lthough it is true that a person may have more than one residence[,] . . . to consider a place as such, he must stay there for some length of time and have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence with at least some degree of permanency" (Hammerman v Louis Watch Co.; see also Katz v Siroty [holding that plaintiff did not establish a second residence at his sister's apartment in Manhattan even though he kept a room there and occasionally stayed overnight for business because, citing the rule in Hammerman, he did not "have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency"])."
- "We agree that a person may reside in more than one place, but that does not mean that every place in which a person spends time constitutes a residence."
- "To the extent plaintiffs also alleged a breach of defendants' contractual duty to repair the premises based on traditional common-law principles, that claim too must fail (see Chapman v Silber [holding that a plaintiff must show the landlord "knew that a young child lived in the apartment" to survive a defendant landlord's motion for summary judgment in a lead paint poisoning case based on traditional common-law principles and a landlord's contractual duty to repair])."
How we compared the opinions
Protection from toxic/environmental exposures
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease protection from toxic/environmental exposures compared with the rule in Judge Fahey's dissent.
Young children would have more protection from lead paint under the dissent because landlords would have to remove or cover lead hazards in more apartments where those children actually live as inhabitants, even if they also live somewhere else. The main opinion reads “reside” narrowly: an apartment is covered only if the child is living there in a settled way, with more than physical presence or a temporary daytime stay, so spending about 50 hours a week at a grandmother’s apartment for child care does not trigger Local Law 1. The dissent rejects that extra permanence-and-intent requirement and treats residence as something a child can have in more than one place. That broader reading expands when the lead-abatement duty applies and makes it easier for exposed children to keep their claims from being thrown out early, which strengthens protection against toxic exposure.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as protection from toxic/environmental exposures:
The rule directly defines and limits enforceable protections against lead-paint exposure by specifying when a landlord’s statutory duty to remove or cover lead-based paint is triggered and what a plaintiff must prove to enforce a lead-exposure claim.
See the methodology for more detail.