Majority opinion by Judge Pigott
If a defendant invokes the right to remain silent but later voluntarily makes a statement, prosecutors cannot use it in their main case, but may use it on cross-examination or rebuttal to challenge the defendant’s inconsistent testimony. An involuntary statement cannot be used even for impeachment.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, Garcia, Rivera, and Stein.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
There is no bright-line rule barring impeachment use of a statement elicited after a defendant invokes the right to remain silent: although such a statement may not be used in the People’s case-in-chief, it may be used on cross-examination or rebuttal to impeach a testifying defendant’s inconsistent testimony if the statement was voluntary, and only an involuntary statement is inadmissible for impeachment.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "We decline defendant's invitation to adopt such a rule and affirm the order of the Appellate Division."
- "Defendant argues that this rule does not go far enough and advocates for a rule that precludes the People from utilizing post-invocation statements on cross-examination or rebuttal for impeachment purposes should a defendant opt to testify."
- "The rule proposed by defendant would render inadmissible for impeachment purposes any statement elicited by law enforcement after the defendant invokes the right to remain silent."
- "The adoption of such a rule, however, would require us to overrule our own decision in Harris and its progeny and would effectively sanction perjury on the part of a testifying defendant by permitting the defendant to offer testimony that is inconsistent or at odds with the defendant's prior statements (see Harris; see also Kulis)."
- "It is undisputed that the statements made by defendant to police were made after he had invoked his Miranda rights and, thus, the People were prohibited from using the statements in their case-in-chief (see People v Wise; Harris)."
- "Hill acknowledged that he was aware of the Harris decision and understood that defendant's post-Miranda statements could not be used by the People in their case-in-chief but could be utilized by the People for impeachment purposes."
- "In People v Harris , this Court held that a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under Miranda v Arizona may be utilized for impeachment purposes on the cross-examination of a defendant whose testimony is inconsistent with the illegally obtained statement (see Harris; see also People v Johnson; People v Kulis)."
- "This Court has long held that if a statement made by the defendant to the police is voluntary, it may be used for impeachment purposes; but if a statement is involuntary, it will not be admissible, even if it may be deemed reliable (see People v Maerling; People v Walker [where statements are involuntarily obtained through coercion, such statements are inadmissible for use on cross-examination or rebuttal])."