Majority opinion by Judge Stein
If the company had a business duty to collect and record the subscriber information, the record may be admitted to show only that the customer gave that information, or for another purpose that does not depend on its truth. It cannot be used to prove the information was true unless another hearsay exception applies.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, Fahey, Garcia, and Pigott.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. CPL 470.15 (1) bars the Appellate Division from affirming a judgment, sentence or order on a ground not decided adversely to the defendant by the trial court, but the Appellate Division does not exceed its authority when, in reviewing an evidentiary ruling, it affirms on the ground relied on by the trial court rather than on a ground explicitly different from the trial court's or one clearly resolved in the defendant's favor. 2. Under the business records exception, a statement in a business record is admissible for its truth only if the informant had personal knowledge of the act, event or condition and was under a business duty to report it to the entrant, unless some other hearsay exception is available; if the informant lacked that business duty but the entrant had a business duty to obtain and record the statement, the entry is admissible only to show that the statement was made, or for another nonhearsay purpose, and not for its truth.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "As a threshold matter, we reject defendant's argument that the Appellate Division exceeded its authority under CPL 470.15 (1), which "bars that court from affirming a judgment, sentence or order on a ground not decided adversely to the [defendant] by the trial court" (People v Concepcion; see People v LaFontaine)."
- "Recently, in People v Nicholson , this Court cautioned against "a flawed and overly narrow construction of the statutory limits of 470.15 (1) as applied to the Appellate Division's review of the trial court's evidentiary ruling[s]" (id. at 825), particularly where the "Appellate Division [does not] render[ ] a decision on grounds explicitly different from those of the trial court or on grounds that were clearly resolved in a defendant's favor—the type of appellate overreaching prohibited by CPL 470.15 (1)—[but affirms an] evidentiary ruling on the ground relied on by the trial court" (id. at 825-826 [citation omitted])."
- "More than 85 years ago, in Johnson v Lutz , this Court imposed an additional requirement for admissibility that is not set forth in the statute—specifically, that "[u]nless some other hearsay exception is available . . . , admission may only be granted where it is demonstrated that the informant has personal knowledge of the act, event or condition and he [or she] is under a business duty to report it to the entrant" (Matter of Leon RR; see Cover v Cohen; Johnson v Lutz; see also Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4518:1; Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-307 [Farrell 11th ed 1995])."
- "Pursuant to this rule, "[i]f the informant was not under a business duty to impart the information, but the entrant was under a business duty to obtain and record the statement, the entry is admissible to establish merely that the statement was made . . . [but] another hearsay exception is necessary in order to receive the statement for its truth" (Hayes v State of New York [emphasis added])."
- "That is, although the contents of the statements in a record are not admissible for the truth of the matters asserted therein under the business records exception to the hearsay rule when the informant was not acting pursuant to a business duty to report, "the contents of the record [nevertheless] may be used for a nonhearsay purpose" (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-307 at 606 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]; see Splawn v Lextaj Corp. [hotel logbook entries reporting burglaries not admissible to prove the crimes occurred but permitted to show hotel had notice of activity]; People v Blanchard [police blotter entry showing phone call made by someone purporting to be defendant's father properly received not for its truth, but to impeach father, who testified that he did not make the call]; Donohue v Losito; see also Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4518:1)."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
Our checks could not confirm a direction for this subarea, so we do not show the AI's reasoning for this opinion's direction on it. That does not mean the case had no effect.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule governs criminal procedural protections by limiting the Appellate Division’s ability to affirm on new grounds and by defining when business-record statements are admissible for their truth versus only for a nonhearsay purpose, both of which directly affect evidentiary rulings, trial fairness, and appellate review in criminal cases.
See the methodology for more detail.