Majority opinion by Judge Stein
If a service provider asks a court to cancel a warrant issued under the federal stored-communications law using state criminal warrant procedures, that request is part of a criminal case, not a civil one, so the provider cannot directly appeal a denial unless a statute specifically allows it.
Also joined by Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, and Fahey.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. A motion to quash a Stored Communications Act warrant issued under Criminal Procedure Law article 690 arises in a criminal, not a civil, proceeding; therefore, absent statutory authorization, an order denying that motion is not appealable. 2. Absent statutory authorization, an order denying a motion to compel disclosure of the affidavit supporting warrants issued in a criminal proceeding is not directly appealable.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "The warrants in question were issued, in accordance with the procedures of CPL article 690, pursuant to title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, officially entitled the "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access" and commonly referred to as the Stored Communications Act or the SCA (see Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub L 99-508, tit II, 100 US Stat 1860, codified as amended at 18 USC § 2701 et seq.)."
- "Conducting that analysis here, we conclude that an SCA warrant—and the relief sought in a challenge to such a warrant—arises in a criminal, not a civil, proceeding."
- "It is a fundamental precept of the jurisdiction of our appellate courts that " '[n]o appeal lies from a determination made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by statute' " (People v Lovett, quoting People v Pagan; see NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; People v Bautista; People v Hernandez; People v De Jesus; People v Zerillo)."
- "No provision of the Criminal Procedure Law articles that govern appeals—which are among " 'the most highly structured and highly particularized articles of procedure' " (Hernandez, quoting People v Laing)—authorizes an appeal to either an intermediate appellate court or to this Court from an order denying a motion to quash or vacate a search warrant (see CPL art 450; CPL 470.60)."
- "Thus, the order is not appealable (see Matter of Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Police; see also Matter of Alphonso C.)."
- "With these principles in mind, because the orders resolving Facebook's motions relate to warrants issued in a criminal proceeding and the Criminal Procedure Law does not authorize an appeal from either order, we are constrained by law to affirm the Appellate Division order dismissing Facebook's appeals to that Court."
- "Supreme Court's order denying Facebook's motion to compel disclosure of the affidavit is, likewise, not appealable, although Facebook may explore other procedural avenues to raise its claim (see Matter of Newsday)."
How we compared the opinions
Due process protections
This majority opinion was compared separately with each of the other opinions in this case. Below is the AI's reasoning for each comparison our checks confirmed.
Decrease Compared with Judge Wilson's dissent:
People whose Facebook accounts are targeted in a criminal investigation would have a much better chance to challenge an overbroad digital search under the dissent’s rule. The main opinion says a motion to quash these Stored Communications Act warrants is part of a criminal proceeding, so there is no direct appeal unless a statute expressly allows one; that leaves the warrant largely insulated from appellate review and pushes any challenge to later suppression proceedings or separate suits, if those ever exist. The dissent says federal law gives the service provider its own motion to quash or narrow unusually voluminous or unduly burdensome warrants, gives it standing to raise users’ interests, and treats the ruling on that motion as a separate, immediately appealable proceeding. That means more judicial review and more procedural hurdles before the state can keep and use large-scale electronic evidence, which is a meaningful increase in criminal-process protection.
Unable to determine direction Compared with Judge Rivera's concurrence:
Our checks could not confirm a result for this comparison, so no reasoning is shown.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as due process protections:
The rule limits direct appellate review of warrant-related orders in a criminal proceeding, including an order denying a motion to quash a warrant and an order denying disclosure of the supporting affidavit. That directly governs criminal procedural protections and review mechanisms tied to search-and-seizure practice.
See the methodology for more detail.