Majority opinion by Judge Stein
A first responder can receive accidental disability retirement benefits only if the injury was caused by a sudden, unexpected event that was not an inherent risk of that job. If the injury arose while performing ordinary duties from a danger inherent in those duties, it is not an accident, no matter the emergency assignment.
Also joined by DiFiore, Feinman, Garcia, and Rivera.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Under Retirement and Social Security Law § 363 (a) (1), a petitioner is entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits only when the precipitating cause of the injury was a sudden, unexpected event that was not a risk inherent in the work performed, considered in light of the particular employment; the focus is on the precipitating cause of the injury, not the petitioner's job assignment, and an injury sustained while performing ordinary duties that results from a risk inherent in those duties is not an "accident."
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Retirement and Social Security Law § 363 (a) (1) provides that a member of the police and firefighters' retirement system "shall be entitled to an accidental disability retirement allowance if, at the time application therefor is filed [the member] is . . . "[p]hysically or mentally incapacitated for performance of duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident not caused by [the member's] own willful negligence sustained in such service.""
- "Under Lichtenstein and McCambridge, an injury-causing event is accidental when it is sudden, unexpected and not a risk of the work performed, but the "focus[ ]" of the determination must be on "the precipitating cause of injury," rather than on "the petitioner's job assignment" (McCambridge)."
- "Stated otherwise, "an injury which occurs without an unexpected event as the result of activity undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties, considered in view of the particular employment in question, is not an accidental injury" (id.)."
- "Two years later, the Court clarified in Matter of McCambridge v McGuire that it is "error . . . [to] focus[ ] on the petitioner's job assignment, not on the precipitating cause of injury" ."
- "In defining "accident," both Lichtenstein and McCambridge relied upon Matter of Covel v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. , which upheld the denial of benefits to a school custodian who slipped on oil that he regularly applied to a floor that he was dust mopping; the Court reasoned that "injuries . . . sustained during the performance of an employee's regular duties and result[ing] from risks inherent in the task being performed" are not accidents (id. at 902)."