Majority opinion by Judge Rowan D. Wilson
First making an immediate gun threat makes a person the first one to threaten deadly force. That person cannot get a self-defense instruction because the unarmed other person tries to knock the gun away, unless the evidence could support a clearly communicated withdrawal before the other person then used or threatened deadly force, or that the other person threatened deadly force first. Otherwise, the judge need not give the instruction.
Also joined by DiFiore, Fahey, Feinman, Garcia, Rivera, and Stein.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
The imminent threat to use a gun against another is a threat of deadly physical force, and the first person in the encounter to make that imminent gun threat is the initial aggressor as to deadly physical force; that person cannot claim justification unless the evidence would permit a finding that the person withdrew and communicated that withdrawal before the other party then used or threatened imminent deadly physical force, or that the other party was the initial deadly-force aggressor, and if no reasonable view of the evidence supports those circumstances, no justification charge is required.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "As for what constitutes such a threat, we held in People v Dodt that the imminent threat to use a gun constituted the threat of deadly physical force even if the gun is never fired. "[T]he threat presented by a gun does not depend to any significant extent on the manner in which it is used. So long as a gun is operable, it constitutes deadly physical force and a threat to use a gun, such as was made here, can only be understood as a threat that the weapon is operable" (id. at 414-415)."
- "Thus, the imminent threat to use a gun against another is, necessarily, a threat of deadly physical force."
- "If mere physical force is employed against a defendant and the defendant responds by employing deadly physical force, "the term initial aggressor is properly defined as the first person in the encounter to use deadly physical force" (People v McWilliams [emphasis omitted])."
- "The first person to make such an imminent threat is, therefore, the initial aggressor with respect to deadly physical force."
- "Because Mr. Brown's drawing of his gun under these circumstances constituted the imminent threat of deadly physical force, the "initial aggressor" rule bars Mr. Brown from claiming justification unless a reasonable jury could conclude either: (1) that Mr. Brown withdrew from the encounter after drawing his gun, communicated that withdrawal to Mr. Cabbagestalk and Mr. Cabbagestalk thereafter used or threatened imminent use of deadly physical force (Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]) or (2) that Mr. Cabbagestalk himself was the initial "deadly force" aggressor. No reasonable jury could reach either conclusion based on the evidence in this case, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Brown (as we must)."
- "However, "when no reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding of the tendered defense, the court is under no obligation to submit the question to the jury" (People v Watts)."
- "However, where, as here, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that Mr. Brown was anything other than the initial aggressor in his use of deadly physical force, he is not entitled to a jury instruction on justification."