Majority opinion by Judge Feinman
Courts can treat industrial equipment as a product for a failure-to-warn claim if the maker controlled its design, gave it a standardized purpose, put it into commerce, and was better able to know and warn of dangers from foreseeable use or misuse. Large size, immobility, attachment to real property, or installation with services does not alone change that; only a purely service transaction with no sale of goods does.
Also joined by Fahey, Rivera, and Wilson.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
In determining as a matter of law whether an article is a "product" for strict products liability under a failure-to-warn theory, courts evaluate the question within the common-law duty-to-warn inquiry and emphasize factors such as the manufacturer's control over the article's design, its standardized purpose, the manufacturer's role in placing it into the stream of commerce, and its superior ability to know of and warn against dangers inherent in reasonably foreseeable uses or misuses; an article's size, immobility, affixation to real property, or taxable status as real property does not by itself preclude product status, and where a good is sold in the course of a transaction, the mere presence of a service component does not mean the furnished item is not a product to which a duty to warn may apply, although strict products liability does not apply when the transaction is clearly one for services and the sale of a good is wholly absent.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "However, "[a]part from statutes that define 'product' for purposes of determining products liability, in every instance it is for the court to determine as a matter of law whether something is or is not, a product" (Restatement [Third] of Torts: Products Liability § 19, Comment a)."
- "In New York, a product is considered "defective," and the manufacturer liable, if the product: (1) "contains a manufacturing flaw," (2) "is defectively designed," or (3) "is not accompanied by adequate warnings for the use of the product" (Liriano v Hobart Corp.). Here, defendant primarily argued on summary judgment that the coke ovens at issue are not "products" to which a duty to warn can attach. Thus, although many of the principles underlying these three categories overlap, our analysis is specific to the "failure-to-warn" category of claims."
- "Thus, on this motion for summary judgment, we evaluate whether the coke ovens are products within the broader context of our common-law principles of assigning a legal duty to warn."
- "To that end, although the criteria for determining whether a duty should attach to a seller may be tied to the nature of the given transaction, our case law emphasizes governing factors such as a defendant's control over the design of the product, its standardization and its superior ability to know—and warn about—the dangers inherent in the product's reasonably foreseeable uses or misuses (see Dummitt)."
- "Second, the record reveals that Wilputte was responsible for placing the ovens into the stream of commerce and that it derived financial benefit from its role in the production process."
- "Further, the fact that something is taxable as real property does not render it outside the realm of strict liability."
- "In fact, other affixed taxable real property under the Real Property Tax Law, such as elevators and large turbines, have nevertheless been subject to strict products liability claims, a point defendant does not refute (see RPTL 102 [12] [f]; Di Marco v Westinghouse Elec. Corp.; Potaczala v Fitzsimmons)."
- "Thus, defendant's emphasis on the ovens' size and immobility is irrelevant to the question of whether they are products for purposes of establishing a duty to warn."
- "Where, however, a good is sold in the course of a transaction, the mere presence of a service component in that transaction does not mean that the furnished item is not a product to which a duty to warn may apply."
- "Indeed, where the predicate sale of a good is wholly absent because the transaction was "clearly one for services" (Perlmutter), we agree that strict products liability does not apply."
How we compared the opinions
Who can be held responsible for an injury
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would increase who can be held responsible for an injury compared with the rule in Judge Stein's dissent.
The dissent would make it harder for injured workers to hold a builder or manufacturer legally responsible for hazards from large industrial equipment. The main opinion says a court should look at who controlled the design, whether the item had a standardized purpose, whether the maker put it into the stream of commerce, and whether the maker was better positioned to know and warn of the danger; on that view, an item does not stop being a product just because it is huge, fixed to real property, or sold as part of a deal that also included services. The dissent instead would treat an integrated, custom-built, immovable industrial structure made for a sophisticated purchaser involved in the design as not a product at all, with no products-liability duty to warn. That narrower rule removes a path to proving responsibility and would dismiss claims like these rather than let them proceed.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as who can be held responsible for an injury:
The rule defines when a manufacturer or seller may face strict products-liability failure-to-warn liability by specifying when an article counts as a product and when a transaction involving goods versus services can support a duty to warn.
See the methodology for more detail.