Unsigned opinion of the court
If the defense specifically asks for contact information for witnesses whose evidence helps the defense, and prosecutors show no need for protective measures, prosecutors cannot require all contact to go through them. They must disclose the information or give another way to reach the witnesses. Otherwise they are suppressing evidence that helps the defense, and that matters if there is a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different.
Joined by DiFiore, Fahey, Feinman, Garcia, Rivera, Stein, and Wilson.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Where, in response to a defendant's specific request and absent a showing warranting protective measures, the prosecution refuses to disclose favorable witnesses' contact information or to provide any means for defense counsel to contact those witnesses other than through the prosecution itself, it denies the defense meaningful access to favorable witnesses and that refusal is tantamount to suppression under Brady; in New York, when the request for the evidence was specific, materiality is measured by whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. 2. Whether the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a defendant's statements was sufficiently attenuated is a mixed question of law and fact, and when the lower court's attenuation determination has record support it is beyond the Court of Appeals' power of review.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "These accounts, if true, would have directly contradicted the People's theory of the case and therefore access to the witnesses who made them was clearly favorable to the defense (see People v Garrett)."
- "The People objected to defendant's pretrial request for the direct disclosure of the witnesses' contact information and instead offered to provide the witnesses with defense counsel's information."
- "Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the People's refusal to disclose the contact information or to provide any means for defense counsel to contact the witnesses other than through the prosecution itself, is tantamount to suppression of the requested information (see United States v Rodriguez [explaining that "Brady information must be disclosed . . . in a manner that gives the defendant a reasonable opportunity either to use the evidence in the trial or to use the information to obtain evidence for use in the trial"])."
- "Furthermore, at the time of the request, the People did not bring forth any evidence that defendant presented a risk to the requested witnesses."
- "Consequently, there was no apparent reason at that time for implementing protective measures or otherwise insulating the contact information from disclosure in the face of defendant's clear "right . . . to discover a potentially material witness" (People v Andre W.; see also CPL 240.50 [1] [allowing the issuance of a protective order upon a showing of "good cause," including a "substantial risk of physical harm" or "intimidation"])."
- "[1] Here, the People failed to fulfill their "broad obligation" of disclosure under Brady by failing to provide defendant with meaningful access to favorable witnesses."
- "Yet this approach would not have provided defendant with adequate means for defense counsel to investigate those witnesses' statements."
- ""In New York, the test of materiality where . . . the defendant has made a specific request for the evidence in question is whether there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the verdict would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed" (People v McCray, quoting People v Vilardi [emphasis added])."
- "[2] Whether the causal connection between defendant's illegal arrest and his statements was sufficiently attenuated presents a mixed question of law and fact."
- "Here, Supreme Court's determination of attenuation has record support and is therefore beyond our powers of review (see People v King)."