Majority opinion by Judge DiFiore
A court may waive the consent of a person being adopted who is over 18, including an adult who lacks capacity, in appropriate circumstances. The lack of that adult’s consent alone does not automatically block the adoption.
Also joined by Fahey, Feinman, Garcia, and Stein.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (a) requires the consent of any adoptee over 14 years old, including an adult adoptee, but gives the judge or surrogate discretion to dispense with that consent in appropriate circumstances; the statute does not limit that discretion to minors or to cases involving potential psychological harm from disclosure of the adoption, so the absence of an adult adoptee's consent does not categorically preclude the adoption.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "Relevant to this case, subdivision (1) (a) provides that consent is required "[o]f the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent" (Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [a])."
- ""Adoptive child" is a term of art defined in the statutory scheme to mean "a person adopted" (Domestic Relations Law § 109 [1] [Definitions])."
- "The phrase "a person adopted" contains no age restriction—clearly encompassing both minors and adults (id.)."
- "Thus, it is clear from the text of Domestic Relations Law §§ 111 (1) (a) and 109 that the statute requires the consent of any adoptee over the age of 14 but gives courts the discretion to dispense with that consent in appropriate circumstances."
- "That the legislature intended the phrase "adoptive child" to encompass not only minors but also adult adoptees is further illustrated by the legislature's use of phrase in a different subdivision of the same statute in a manner that clearly refers to adoptees over the age of 18 (see Domestic Relations Law § 111 [4] ["(w)here the adoptive child is over the age of eighteen years"])."
- "However, the statutory language does not restrict the scope of the court's discretion to dispense with adoptee consent—let alone reflect an intent to limit the exercise of such discretion to the particular circumstance identified by MHLS."
- "MHLS and the dissent rely on certain legislative history to assert that the legislature intended to authorize judges to dispense with consent of minor adoptees in only one circumstance—where knowledge of the adoption proceeding and discovery that the putative adoptive parents are not the child's biological parents would psychologically damage the child."
- "The language permitting a court to dispense with adoptee consent was added to the statute in 1942 and the accompanying bill jacket includes statements in support of the amendment, submitted by various interested parties, noting that it would give courts discretionary authority to dispense with adoptee consent in such a circumstance (see Mem from NY County Lawyers' Assn, Mar. 3, 1942, Bill Jacket, L 1942, ch 118 at 4-5; Letter from George Xanthaky to the Governor, Mar. 16, 1942, Bill Jacket, L 1942, ch 118 at 8)."
- "From this we can infer that the legislature understood that the statute would permit courts to grant adoption petitions in the absence of adoptee consent when appropriate to avoid psychological harm to a child who was unaware of the adoption proceedings."
- "Had the legislature intended to limit judicial discretion in that manner, it would have said so in the statute."
- "We agree with the Appellate Division that, in appropriate circumstances, the statute permits a court to approve an adoption even absent the consent of an adult adoptee."
- "Moreover, MHLS' interpretation of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (a) would categorically preclude the adoption of adults who lack the capacity to consent."
- "[2] Here, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (a) provided express statutory authority to dispense with Marian's consent and the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that her inability to consent should not prevent this adoption (see Sadek v Wesley, citing Brady v Ottaway Newspapers)."
- "Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in determining it was appropriate to dispense with Marian T.'s consent, as the statute permits."
How we compared the opinions
Ability to establish parentage or adopt
This majority opinion was compared separately with each of the other opinions in this case. Below is the AI's reasoning for each comparison our checks confirmed.
Increase Compared with Judge Rivera's dissent:
The dissent would make some New York adoptions impossible, especially when the person to be adopted is an adult who cannot legally consent. Under the main rule, a judge may excuse the consent of any adoptee over 14, including an adult, when the circumstances warrant it, so the court can still consider whether the adoption should go forward. The dissent would limit that power to minors ages 14 to 17 and make an adult’s consent an absolute precondition, meaning the petition must be dismissed before any best-interests review if the adult cannot consent. That stricter rule reduces who is eligible to be adopted and adds a threshold barrier to completing the adoption process.
Unable to determine direction Compared with Judge Wilson's concurrence:
Our checks could not confirm a result for this comparison, so no reasoning is shown.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as ability to establish parentage or adopt:
The rule directly governs an adoption-process requirement—adoptee consent—and confirms that courts may dispense with that consent even for adult adoptees in appropriate circumstances, so lack of consent does not automatically bar completion of the adoption.
See the methodology for more detail.