Majority opinion by Judge DiFiore
Redistricting must go through the independent redistricting commission unless a court steps in. If the first plan is rejected, the commission must submit a second plan for a vote without changes. Only if the second plan is rejected may the legislature enact maps by amending a commission plan. If the deadline has passed, the legislature cannot cure the defect, and a court may adopt maps with a neutral expert.
Also joined by Cannataro, Garcia, and Singas.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Under article III, § 4, the Independent Redistricting Commission process is the exclusive method of redistricting absent court-ordered relief: the Independent Redistricting Commission must submit a first plan and, if that plan is rejected, a second plan for legislative up-or-down votes without amendment, and only if the second plan is rejected may the legislature enact implementing legislation by amending an Independent Redistricting Commission plan; legislation cannot authorize the legislature to bypass that process. 2. To establish a violation of article III, § 4 (c) (5)'s ban on partisan gerrymandering, a challenger must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that districts were drawn to discourage competition or to favor or disfavor incumbents, other particular candidates, or political parties, and that impermissible intent may be shown directly or circumstantially through proof of a partisan process excluding the minority party and evidence of discriminatory results, including lines that impactfully and unduly favor or disfavor a party or reduce competition. 3. Where legislative maps have been determined to be unenforceable, the state is in the same predicament as if no maps had been enacted, and prompt judicial intervention is necessary and appropriate to protect the right to a free and fair election; if the constitutional deadline for the Independent Redistricting Commission to submit a second set of maps has passed, the procedural defect is incapable of legislative cure, and a court may order the adoption of a redistricting plan with judicial supervision and the assistance of a neutral special master rather than permit an election to proceed under unconstitutional maps.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "It is no surprise, then, that the Constitution dictates that the IRC-based process for redistricting established therein "shall govern redistricting in this state except to the extent that a court is required to order the adoption of or changes to, a redistricting plan as a remedy for a violation of law" (NY Const, art III, § 4 [e] [emphasis added])."
- "Under the 2014 amendments, compliance with the IRC process enshrined in the Constitution is the exclusive method of redistricting, absent court intervention following a violation of the law, incentivizing the legislature to encourage and support fair bipartisan participation and compromise throughout the redistricting process."
- "The Constitution now requires that the IRC—a bipartisan commission working under a constitutionally mandated timeline—is charged with the obligation of drawing a set of redistricting maps that, with appropriate implementing legislation, must be submitted to the legislature for a vote, without amendment (see NY Const, art III, §§ 4 [b]; 5-b [a])."
- "After considering public comments and working together across party lines to compose new redistricting lines, the IRC must submit its approved plan and implementing legislation to the legislature no later than January 15th in a redistricting year (see NY Const, art III, § 4 [b]), with the caveat that, if the IRC is unable to muster the requisite number of votes for a single plan, it must provide the legislature with each plan that "garnered the highest number of votes in support of its approval by the [IRC]" (NY Const, art III, § 5-b [g])."
- "If this first set of maps is rejected, the IRC is required to prepare a second set that, again, would be subject to an up or down vote by the legislature, without amendment (see NY Const, art III, § 4 [b])."
- "If the legislature rejects the IRC's first plan, the Constitution requires the IRC to go back to the drawing board, work to reach consensus and "prepare and submit to the legislature a second redistricting plan and the necessary implementing legislation" to the legislature within 15 days and in no case later than February 28th (NY Const, art III, § 4 [b])."
- "The plain language of article III, § 4 dictates that the IRC "shall prepare" and "shall submit" to the legislature a redistricting plan with implementing legislation, that IRC plan "shall be voted upon, without amendment" by the legislature and—in the event the first plan is rejected—the IRC "shall prepare and submit to the legislature a second redistricting plan and the necessary implementing legislation," which again "shall be voted upon, without amendment" (NY Const, art III, § 4 [b] [emphasis added])."
- "Under that constitutional framework, only upon rejection of a second set of IRC maps is the legislature free to offer amendments to the maps created by the IRC (see NY Const, art III, § 4 [b]) and, even then, a statutory restriction enacted as a companion to the constitutional reforms precluded legislative alterations that would affect more than two percent of the population in any district (see L 2012, ch 17, § 3)."
- ""If" the legislature fails to approve the second plan without amendment, the Constitution then directs that "each house shall introduce such implementing legislation"—a clear reference to the IRC's second plan—with any amendments each house of the legislature deems necessary (NY Const, art III, § 4 [b])."
- ""If" and only "if" that second plan is rejected, does the Constitution permit the legislature to introduce its own implementing legislation, "with any amendments" to the IRC plans deemed necessary that otherwise comply with constitutional directives (NY Const, art III, § 4 [b] [emphasis added])."
- "Moreover, the text of section 4 contemplates that any redistricting act ultimately adopted must be founded upon a plan submitted by the IRC; in the event the IRC plan is rejected, the Constitution authorizes "amendments" to such plan, not the wholesale drawing of entirely new maps (NY Const, art III, § 4 [b]; see NY Assembly Debate on 2012 NY Assembly Bill A9557, Mar. 15, 2012 at 39 ["The Constitutional amendment allows the (l)egislature to amend the plan submitted by the independent redistricting commission if the (l)egislature has twice rejected submitted plans" (emphasis added)])."
- "After New York voters rejected this constitutional amendment (among others)—and with the first redistricting cycle since the 2014 amendments on the horizon—the legislature attempted to fill a purported "gap" in constitutional language by statutorily amending the IRC procedure in the same manner (see L 2021, ch 633)."
- "The 2021 legislation is unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the legislature to avoid a central requirement of the reform amendments (see Matter of King ["The (l)egislature must be guided and governed in this particular function by the Constitution, not by a self-generated additive"])."
- "In addition to the procedural amendments, in 2014, the people also amended the New York State Constitution to include certain substantive limitations on redistricting, including an express prohibition on partisan gerrymandering, commanding that "[d]istricts shall not be drawn to discourage competition or for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties" (NY Const, art III, § 4 [c] [5])."
- "To prevail on such claim, petitioners bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the congressional districts were drawn with a particular impermissible intent or motive—that is, to "discourage competition" or to "favor[ ] or disfavor[ ] incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties" (NY Const, art III, § 4 [c] [5])."
- "Such invidious intent could be demonstrated directly or circumstantially through proof of a partisan process excluding participation by the minority party and evidence of discriminatory results (i.e., lines that impactfully and unduly favor or disfavor a political party or reduce competition)."
- "Where, as here, legislative maps have been determined to be unenforceable, we are left in the same predicament as if no maps had been enacted."
- "Prompt judicial intervention is both necessary and appropriate to guarantee the people's right to a free and fair election."
- "The deadline in the Constitution for the IRC to submit a second set of maps has long since passed."
- "The procedural unconstitutionality of the congressional and senate maps is, at this juncture, incapable of a legislative cure."
- "Indeed, our State Constitution both requires expedited judicial review of redistricting challenges (see NY Const, art III, § 5)—as occurred here—and authorizes the judiciary to "order the adoption of or changes to, a redistricting plan" in the absence of a constitutionally-viable legislative plan (NY Const, art III, § 4 [e])."
- "Thus, we endorse the procedure directed by Supreme Court to "order the adoption of . . . a redistricting plan" (NY Const, art III, § 4 [e]) with the assistance of a neutral expert, designated a special master, following submissions from the parties, the legislature and any interested stakeholders who wish to be heard."
- "With judicial supervision and the support of a neutral expert designated a special master, there is sufficient time for the adoption of new district lines."
- "We reject this invitation to subject the people of this state to an election conducted pursuant to an unconstitutional reapportionment."
- "Like the courts below, however, we are not convinced that we have no choice but to allow the 2022 primary election to proceed on unconstitutionally enacted and gerrymandered maps."
How we compared the opinions
Protection against politically tilted district maps
This majority opinion was compared separately with each of the other opinions in this case. Every comparison pointed in the same direction, so that shared direction is shown above. Below is the AI's reasoning for each comparison.
Compared with Judge Rivera's dissent:
The dissent would make it easier for the legislature to keep its own district maps in place, and harder for voters to get maps replaced when they believe the lines were drawn for partisan advantage. The main opinion treats the Independent Redistricting Commission process as the required starting point: the legislature cannot bypass the commission, and if that process breaks down and the deadline has passed, a court can void the maps and install new ones under judicial supervision with a neutral special master. The dissent takes the opposite approach on that key point, saying the legislature may go ahead and draft and enact maps itself when the commission does not submit another plan, and it would also uphold those maps unless challengers can overcome a very strong presumption of constitutionality. That weakens the independent redistricting check and makes partisan-tilted maps harder to challenge, correct, or replace.
Compared with Judge Wilson's dissent:
Voters and minority-party interests would have a harder time getting a politically tilted map blocked and replaced under the dissent. The main opinion treats the Independent Redistricting Commission process as mandatory, allows partisan intent to be inferred from both a one-party mapmaking process and skewed real-world effects, and, when that process has already broken down, lets a court impose a new map under judicial supervision with a neutral special master. The dissent is narrower at both stages: it says a map cannot be struck down just because it strongly benefits one party unless challengers prove purposeful partisan intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and even after a violation the court cannot turn to a neutral referee but must give the legislature another chance to fix the map. That leaves more control with the political branches and makes correction of alleged gerrymanders harder, so protection against politically tilted maps is lower.
Compared with Judge Troutman's dissent:
Voters would have less protection against party-favored district maps under the dissent because, after striking the 2022 maps on procedural grounds, it would send the fix back to the legislature instead of having a court promptly impose new maps under neutral supervision. The main opinion does more: it not only treats the Independent Redistricting Commission process as mandatory, but also lets challengers prove partisan gerrymandering and, once the deadline for a second Commission plan has passed, allows a court and special master to replace invalid maps rather than wait for the political branches to try again. The dissent would refuse to decide whether the congressional map was substantively drawn to help Democrats and would give the legislature a new chance to adopt one of the Commission-approved plans with limited amendments. That narrower judicial review and more legislature-centered remedy make it harder to fully correct or replace a map alleged to be politically tilted.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as protection against politically tilted district maps:
The rule directly governs the independent-redistricting process, the proof standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, and when courts may replace unenforceable maps with a judicially supervised plan. Those are all core safeguards against district maps being drawn or kept in place to favor a party, incumbents, or aligned candidates.
See the methodology for more detail.