Majority opinion by Judge Michael J. Garcia
If a city’s notice law names an office that was abolished but its duties moved to another department, notice must go to that department’s commissioner. A road-defect report typed by a resident into the city’s only tracking system and routed to that department counts as written notice actually given to the commissioner, even without personal review. A verbal complaint later entered by staff does not.
Also joined by Cannataro, Halligan, Rivera, Singas, Troutman, and Wilson.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
1. Where a prior written notice statute names a municipal office that has been abolished, but that office's functions, powers, and personnel have been transferred to a successor department, the statute is read to require notice to the successor department's commissioner rather than to excuse compliance as impossible. A road-defect report typed by a user into a municipality's SeeClickFix online reporting system and transmitted to the responsible department is a "written" communication, while a verbal complaint later memorialized in that system by municipal staff is not; and when the department uses that system as its sole internal system to log, track, and follow up on road-defect complaints, notices routed through the system are "actually given" to the statutory designee even without the commissioner's personal review. 2. The affirmative negligence exception to a prior written notice requirement applies only when the locality's negligent act immediately gives rise to the dangerous condition; when that exception applies, prior written notice is not required. 3. A municipality acts in a proprietary, not governmental, capacity when repairing a roadway excavation as part of its duty to keep roadways reasonably safe; for such work it is subject to the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties and is not entitled to governmental immunity.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "As a threshold matter, plaintiff argues that the City's notice statute is unenforceable because it requires that prior written notice be actually given to the Commissioner of Public Works, an office that no longer exists."
- "Compliance with the plain language of the statute was impossible for the approximately 20-year period from the time the Department of Public Works was abolished to the amendment substituting the DGS Commissioner as the designated official after plaintiff's accident and therefore, plaintiff argues, any notice requirement during that period should be excused."
- "We decline to read the statute in a manner that would produce such an "objectionable, unreasonable or absurd consequence[ ]" (Long v State of New York; see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 141 [statutes should not be read to require impossibility])."
- "The relevant statutes abolishing the Department of Public Works make clear that all functions, power and personnel belonging to that department were transferred to DGS (see Code of City of Albany §§ 42-101, 42-104)."
- "Accordingly, we read the statute, as did the lower courts, to require that prior written notice be actually given to the Commissioner of DGS."
- "Reports of road defects go to DGS, the agency responsible for road maintenance."
- "We therefore hold that a report typed into SCF by a user and then transmitted to DGS is a "written" communication (cf. Van Wageningen v City of Ithaca [acknowledging that an email is a "written complaint" for purposes of prior written notice]; Bochner v Town of Monroe [recognizing that an email can serve as prior written notice])."
- "However, any notices received verbally, for example via telephone and memorialized by DGS staff in the SCF system do not qualify as "written" (see Gorman v Town of Huntington ["Nor can a verbal or telephonic communication to a municipal body that is reduced to writing satisfy a prior written notice requirement"]; see also Tortorici v City of New York [request generated from a "311" call and entered by clerk into the computer system was not written notice])."
- "SCF is the only system used by DGS to log, track and follow up on road defect reports, including all road defect reports received from DGS employees in the field or from members of the public who call or submit reports by regular mail."
- "The Commissioner of DGS has access to the SCF system but, as a matter of choice, has "[n]ever personally reviewed any type of complaint from any source pertaining to any road defect[ ]," opting instead to receive a spreadsheet listing reported complaints and work done to address them."
- "Nevertheless, we hold, based on DGS's specific process for routing and maintaining the road defect reports received through SCF, that those notices were "actually given" to the statutory designee."
- "Here, DGS created a system for processing complaints that bypassed the need for the Commissioner's personal review."
- "SCF was promoted by the Commissioner as a tool for reporting road defects within the City and was the only internal system for tracking those complaints and any remedial work done in response."
- "In sum, DGS used SCF to receive, track and follow up on notices provided through SCF, as well as notices received through all other channels and subsequent repairs were then documented in the same system."
- "As a result, we hold that, even though not personally received by the Commissioner, these notices were "actually given" to the statutory designee."
- "We have recognized two exceptions to the prior notice requirement—"namely, where the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence and where a 'special use' confers a special benefit upon the locality" (Amabile [citations omitted])."
- "For the affirmative negligence exception to apply, the locality's negligent act must immediately give rise to the dangerous condition (see Yarborough v City of New York)."
- "Supreme Court also properly determined that issues of fact precluded summary judgment as to whether the City's alleged negligence immediately resulted in a dangerous condition that caused plaintiff's accident—in which case, the prior written notice requirement would not apply."
- "As relevant here, "[a] municipality's proprietary duty to keep its roadways in a reasonably safe condition is well settled" (Turturro v City of New York [citations omitted])."
- "Here, while the City's response to the water main break may have been a governmental function, the City's repair of the excavation on Lark Street was a proprietary function."
- "Conversely, a governmental entity acts in "a purely proprietary role when its 'activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises' " and so "is subject to suit [for such activities] under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties" (id., quoting Sebastian)."
- "As a result, the City is not entitled to governmental immunity from suit."