Majority opinion by Judge Michael J. Garcia
Under New York’s impaired-driving law, “impaired” has the same meaning in the alcohol, drug, and alcohol-plus-drugs offenses: the person’s physical or mental abilities needed to drive as a reasonable and prudent driver are actually affected to any extent. Courts may not use the separate standard for being “intoxicated.”
Also joined by Cannataro, Halligan, Rivera, Singas, Troutman, and Wilson.
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
In Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, the term "impaired" must be interpreted consistently throughout the statute in accordance with People v Cruz—which defines impairment as actual impairment, to any extent, of the physical and mental abilities a person is expected to possess to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver—and not by Cruz's separate "intoxicated" standard.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "We disagree with that approach and hold that "impaired" should be interpreted consistently across Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 in accordance with the definition that this Court gave that term in People v Cruz and therefore affirm."
- "Conversely, " 'where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout and the same meaning will be attached to similar expressions in the same or a related statute' " (People v Corr, quoting McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 236 at 401 [1971 ed])."
- "We must therefore presume that the Legislature meant for these identical terms " 'to be used in the same sense throughout' " the same statute (People v Bolden, quoting McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 236)."
- "[2] Consequently, the Court held that the term "impaired" as used in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a) "should be defined consistently with the definition of that same term" set out by this Court in Cruz and concluded that the People properly instructed the grand jury in accordance with Cruz's impairment standard (id. at 77, citing Cruz)."
- "The Court held that an individual is impaired when: "by voluntarily consuming alcohol, th[e] . . . defendant has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" (id. at 427)."
- "An individual becomes intoxicated when: "the driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" (id. at 428)."
- "As the Appellate Division below explained, "in light of the separate definitions given to the terms 'impaired' and 'intoxication,' by using the term 'impaired' in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a), the legislature clearly did not intend for that term to be defined in accordance with the standard used for the term 'intoxication' " ."