Majority opinion by Judge Shirley Troutman
An owner or contractor can be liable without controlling the work only if a construction safety rule identifies a specific danger and requires a specific protective step. The excavation rule banning work where equipment or falling material may strike workers is too general to do that.
Also joined by Cannataro, Garcia, and Singas.
How we found this rule
The rule above is a plain-language restatement of the legal rule our AI process identified for this opinion. The restatement is meant to make that rule easier to read, not to change its legal meaning. We only use the legal rule, not its restatement, to identify the direction of an opinion in a given subarea.
The underlying legal rule:
Under Labor Law § 241 (6), only Industrial Code provisions mandating compliance with concrete specifications—meaning they identify a specific safety concern and command a specific action required to address that concern—give rise to the nondelegable duty that supports vicarious liability; 12 NYCRR 23-4.2 (k), which broadly prohibits permitting persons to work where they may be struck or endangered by excavation equipment or by material being dislodged by or falling from such equipment but specifies no required action or protective measure, is not sufficiently specific.
Before any rule identified by the AI is displayed or used to determine the direction of an opinion on a subarea, the AI selects passages from the opinion that support the legal rule it identified. A separate AI check then confirms that those passages fully support the rule. The AI selected these passages from the opinion to support this legal rule:
- "However, this vicarious liability is limited: "only 'provisions of the Industrial Code mandating compliance with concrete specifications' give rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6)" (Toussaint v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., quoting Ross)."
- "Our caselaw demonstrates that, to be sufficiently specific to support a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action, a provision of the Industrial Code must both identify a specific safety concern and command a specific action required to address that concern (compare Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Constr. Co. [holding that a regulation forbidding employers from permitting employees to work on a slippery surface and requiring employers to remove any slippery substances or debris was sufficiently specific],and Morris v Pavarini Const. [holding that a regulation requiring a "form"—e.g., a "mold used in the fabrication of concrete walls"—be "braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape" set forth sufficiently "specific requirements"], with Gasques v State of New York [holding that a regulation generally prohibiting employers from permitting employees to work with machinery not in good repair or safe working condition was insufficiently specific because it did not set forth a "specific standard of conduct" required to avoid the safety concern])."
- "Section 23-4.2 (k)—the provision of the Industrial Code at issue here—provides that "[p]ersons shall not be suffered or permitted to work in any area where they may be struck or endangered by any excavation equipment or by any material being dislodged by or falling from such equipment" (12 NYCRR 23-4.2 [k])."
- "By its terms, section 23-4.2 (k) broadly prohibits people from being allowed to work in areas where they may be exposed to dangers posed by excavation equipment."
- "Unlike the provision in Toussaint, section 23-4.2 (k) fails to state any action, whatsoever, required to address the safety concerns set forth in the provision."
- "The section also does not identify any protective measures or reasonable precautions that a site owner must take in order to comply with the section."
- "We disagree and conclude that section 23-4.2 (k) is not sufficiently specific or "concrete" enough to "give rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6)" (Toussaint [internal quotation marks omitted])."
How we compared the opinions
Who can be held responsible for an injury
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease who can be held responsible for an injury compared with the rule in Judge Wilson's dissent.
Injured construction workers would have an easier path to hold owners and general contractors responsible for excavation-site injuries under the dissent’s rule. The main opinion treats Industrial Code section 23-4.2(k) as too general to trigger Labor Law § 241(6): it names a danger, but it does not prescribe a concrete required measure, so it cannot create the nondelegable duty that allows vicarious liability against an owner like Mezuyon. The dissent, by contrast, reads section 23-4.2(k) together with section 23-9.5(c) as a specific keep-away command—workers other than the operating crew, pitman, and excavating crew must be kept out of the excavator’s danger zone. Because that reading would let Mann’s claim proceed against the owner even without showing the owner supervised the work, it broadens who may be held legally responsible for the injury.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as who can be held responsible for an injury:
The rule defines when a Labor Law § 241 (6) claim can impose a nondelegable duty and vicarious liability by requiring a sufficiently concrete Industrial Code mandate. That directly governs whether this defendant can be held legally responsible for the injury.
See the methodology for more detail.
Workplace safety requirements
Below is the AI's reasoning for why this opinion's rule would decrease workplace safety requirements compared with the rule in Judge Wilson's dissent.
Construction workers near excavation equipment would get a stronger, enforceable safety rule under the dissent. The main opinion says Industrial Code section 23-4.2(k) is too general: it describes a danger zone around excavation equipment, but it does not spell out a concrete protective step, so it cannot support a Labor Law § 241(6) claim against an owner or general contractor that did not supervise the work. The dissent reads section 23-4.2(k) together with section 23-9.5(c) to impose a specific keep-away command—owners and general contractors must keep everyone except the operating crew, pitman, and excavating crew out of areas where excavators or dislodged material could strike them, and a violation can support a § 241(6) claim. That moves the law toward more workplace-safety obligation and stronger enforcement because it converts this regulation from a nonenforceable general warning into a mandatory exclusion rule with a damages remedy.
Why this subarea? The AI's reasoning for tagging this opinion as workplace safety requirements:
The rule directly limits which Industrial Code safety regulations can support a Labor Law § 241 (6) nondelegable workplace-safety duty: only provisions with concrete, specific commands qualify. That changes the enforceable scope of workplace-safety standards, not merely tort procedure or damages.
See the methodology for more detail.