Scrutinize and Reinvent Albany thank Mayor Zohran Mamdani for including important new transparency, professional diversity, and outreach requirements in his new Executive Order 6, which changes the Executive Order creating the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary (MACJ). Mamdani’s order revokes the Adams administration's Executive Order 14.

Unfortunately, EO 6 does not adopt several fundamental reforms recommended in Scrutinize and Reinvent Albany’s December 2025 report, Building a 21st Century Judiciary, including:

• More independent nominating authority for MACJ membership.
• Requiring a written public explanation when the Mayor declines a MACJ member nominee submitted by another nominating authority.
• Making judicial reappointments fully competitive against the applicant pool.

The practical impact of EO 6 depends on how it is implemented. What will MACJ publish about its process and consideration of candidates beyond the order’s minimum requirements? What policies will MACJ adopt under the order’s broad grant of procedural discretion, including on ethics, recusals, and voting procedures?

Where EO 6 moves the system forward

Transparency is treated as an operating requirement, not an optional practice. EO 6 newly requires MACJ to publish key information (most notably, annual aggregate pipeline/demographic reporting and a searchable public record of judicial appointees).

• The EO’s transparency mandate aligns with several core transparency recommendations and will help build confidence in the City’s courts and judges.

Professional diversity within MACJ membership is elevated explicitly. Unlike EO 14’s general diversity language, EO 6 states that MACJ membership shall reflect the breadth of the legal profession and enumerates key practice areas. This change broadens the range of professional experience informing candidate evaluation.

• EO 6 adopts the spirit of our professional‑diversity recommendation by naming practice areas that MACJ membership should include experience in.¹
• The EO’s language aligns with our recommendation for MACJ membership to include at least one member from each borough.

Major reforms that EO 6 does not adopt

Nominating power remains concentrated. EO 6 keeps the same basic allocation of nominating influence as EO 14.² Yet leading judicial-selection standards, including the O'Connor Judicial Selection Plan, favor a mix of appointing authorities to reduce political capture and increase perceived independence.

No mayoral accountability for veto power. EO 6 preserves the Mayor’s ability to decline nominees submitted by other nominating authorities, but does not require a written, public explanation when that occurs. This further centralizes power in the Mayor’s hands and may undermine confidence that MACJ operates free from political interference. The EO, however, does not preclude Mayor Mamdani from providing this information to the public.

Reappointments remain non-competitive. We recommended treating an expiring seat as a vacancy and evaluating incumbents in direct comparison with the applicant pool. EO 6 retains the old approach: MACJ evaluates incumbents for reappointment independently of the pool of candidates.

Weakened removal protections for MACJ members. EO 6 deletes EO 14’s for‑cause removal standard and instead states that members serve “at the pleasure” of the Mayor, without requiring cause or a public explanation for removal. We recommended maintaining “for cause” removal powers and expanding them to the full Committee when violations of the code of conduct occur.

Open questions and implementation-dependent areas

These are areas where EO 6 is vague or leaves outcomes to be determined by discretionary choices by MACJ itself. Whether New Yorkers see progress will depend on implementation.

Supermajority voting. We recommended future EOs require a supermajority vote to advance candidates out of the committee. EO 6 does not include a voting threshold, providing instead that MACJ “may adopt” procedures and criteria.

• Recommendation to MACJ: Adopt a supermajority voting requirement.

Enforceable code of conduct. EO 6 requires MACJ to adopt and publish a code of conduct. Whether the code will be both detailed and enforceable is unclear. EO 6 also states that MACJ members “serve at the pleasure of the Mayor,” rather than being removable for cause by the Mayor (EO 14) or by vote of the full Committee for code violations (our recommendation).

• Recommendation to MACJ: Adopt a detailed, enforceable code of conduct with clear recusal and reporting requirements, written records, and a formal process for investigating and documenting violations. Include a mechanism for the committee to recommend removal for cause to the Mayor.

Expansive transparency tracker. EO 6 codifies disclosure of information MACJ mostly already publishes (appointee name, appointment date), adds court, and newly requires it in a searchable format. EO 6 doesn't require, but also doesn't prohibit, publishing additional non-confidential data that would make the tracker more useful: the appointing mayor, term start and end dates (including prior terms), each appointed judge’s Recommendation Report,³ and whether a judge is currently under review for reappointment.

• Recommendation to MACJ: Publish comprehensive data, including appointing mayor, term start and end dates (including prior terms), Recommendation Reports, and whether a judge is currently under review for reappointment. At the same time, MACJ should maintain appropriate confidentiality for first‑time applicants.

Full and public criteria and procedural rules. EO 6 requires publication of a general description of the stages of evaluation and the non‑exclusive criteria used to assess candidates. This means that MACJ may withhold from the public some of its assessment criteria and important information on how it evaluates judicial candidates.

• Recommendation to MACJ: Publish detailed and comprehensive documentation of the evaluation process, including all criteria used, how they are applied, and what sources of information are considered.

Staffing and operational capacity. EO 6 expands MACJ’s responsibilities, but whether the committee can deliver on them will depend on staff capacity.

• Recommendation to MACJ: Increase staff capacity and publish a full staff roster.

Full member access to candidate files. Our report noted that former MACJ members reported being unable to access complete application files screened by the committee’s staff. EO 6 leaves unclear whether committee members will have full, consistent access.

• Recommendation to MACJ: Guarantee members full access to all candidate files and publish this policy publicly.